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A REVALUATION OF CY PRES REDUX
Alberto B. Lopez*
With its enactment in 2000, Section 413 of the Uniform Trust Code
(UTC) introduced the most recent, and important, revision to a court's
cy pres power since the nineteenth century. Section 413 expands the
court's power to redistribute the assets offailing charitable trusts by
transforming one of the traditional elements of cy pres into a
presumption, abandoning the traditional cy pres redistribution
standard,and providing an additionaljustificationfor the exercise of
the power. Although scholars have scrutinized other portions of the
UTC, the UTC's reconfigured cy pres has failed to provoke scholarly
discussion even though it has been adopted by twenty-one
jurisdictions. Notably, the vacuum of scholarly examination of UTC
Section 413 intersects what has been described as "the largest
intergenerationalwealth transfer in history. " Estimates suggest that
charities alone stand to receive up to $24.8 trillion over the next
several decades and some of those assets will undoubtedly be held in
charitable trusts. Thus, the merger of UTC Section 413 with the
massive wealth transfer over the next decades means that courts will
wield increasingpower to redistribute enormous sums of charitable
resources as the objectives of some charitable trusts become obsolete
in the future.
This Article fills that scholarly void by subjecting the modifications to
cy pres introduced by the UTC to a critical evaluation and offers a
view of the UTC's cy pres that is contrary to its perceived acceptance.
The Article begins by outlining the evolution of cy pres in England
and the United States through the promulgation of the UTC to
highlight the substantialdifferences between the UTC's cy pres and its
traditionalancestor. The historicalshift represented by UTC Section
413 tilts the theoretical balance of interests too far toward the public
interest and fails to fulfill its underlying goal of promoting efficient
use of scare resources. To counter these theoretical and efficiency
concerns, the Article proposes replacing the UTC's presumption of
general charitable intent with a presumption of specific charitable
* Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. This
Article's title is drawn from the title of a note that evaluated cy pres at the time of the Restatement
(First) of Trusts, published by the Yale Law Journal. See Note, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L. J.
303 (1939).
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intent. Although presuming specific charitableintent is likely to result
in an increase in cy pres denials, presuming specific charitableintent
benefits charity generally by increasing the number of charities that
will receive assets via cy pres without any loss in efficiency. In the
end, a presumption of specific charitable intent not only serves as a
counterweight to the trend of increasingpaternalism associated with
charity law, but also ultimately benefits the public by reducing
litigationcosts.

I. INTRODUCTION
Cy pres, the equitable power of a court to redistribute the assets of a
failing charitable trust to a charitable beneficiary that comports with the
donor's general charitable intent as near as possible,' has long been
mired in confusion and controversy. Merely pronouncing "cy pres,"
which is shorthand for the Norman French phrase "cy pres comme
possible,"2 presents an obstacle even before considering the substance of
the doctrine. Pronunciation, however, is only the first obstacle to be
surmounted. Prior to the Restatement (First) of Trusts in 1935, cy pres
seemed to have as many definitions as courts and commentators
referring to it. 3 Furthermore, cy pres has proven difficult to distinguish
from its fraternal twin-equitable deviation. Cy pres alters the
substantive purposes of a charitable trust while equitable deviation only
permits a court to alter the administrative provisions of a trust under
changed circumstances.4 Given that hazy distinction, courts have
§

1. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 431, at 114
AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER,THE LAW OF TRUSTS §

ed. 2005); 4A

(3d

399

(4th ed. 1989).
2. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1,§ 431, at 113-14 (the phrase translates to "as near as
possible").
3. John S. Bradway, Tendencies in the Application of the Cy-Pres Doctrine, 5 TEMP. L.Q. 489,
490 (1931) (asserting that cy pres is "susceptible of various definitions"); John Thompson Peters, Jr., A
Decade of Cy Pres: 1955-1965, 39 TEMP.L.Q. 256 (1965) (stating that "[tihe doctrine of cy pres has
been defined in almost as many ways as there are cases which have dealt with the subject").
4. EDITH L. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE INTHE UNITED STATES 3 (1950). The Restatement
(Second) of Trusts illustrates the subtle differences between the two doctrines. The Restatement's
definition of equitable deviation is:
The court will direct or permit the trustee of a charitable trust to deviate from a term of
the trust if it appears to the court that compliance is impossible or illegal, or that owing to
circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him compliance would
defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959). The Restatement's definition of cy pres is that:

If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it is or
becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular purpose, and if
the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the property to charitable
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struggled to apply the doctrines consistently, which adds another piece
To make matters worse, the
to an already complicated puzzle.5
nomenclature is less than straightforward because either cy pres or
equitable deviation
might be referred to as "equitable approximation" or
"approximation." 6 Suffice it to say that the definitional and substantive
challenges make pronunciation the lowest hurdle to overcome.
Despite the questions that have dogged cy pres over time, the power

is recognized in most modem courts by statute or common law. 7
Traditionally, the first requirement for judicial exercise of cy pres is that
the trust is charitable, which has proven to be a more significant obstacle
than might be expected because of the numerous definitions of
"charitable." 8 Assuming that the trust is charitable, a cy pres applicant
purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to
some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.
Id. § 399. Cy pres, then, not only permits substantive modifications to the purpose of a charitable trust,
but also requires general charitable intent, which is not a requirement for a court to invoke equitable
deviation.
5. Committee on Charitable Trusts and Foundations, Cy Pres and Deviation: Current Trends in
Application, 8 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 391, 399 (1973) (stating that "[tlhe courts, however, had had
considerable difficulty in distinguishing between the two doctrines and often a change is made in the
name of cy pres when in fact only a deviation from the terms of administration is at issue. Conversely,
some courts have used the deviation doctrine to accomplish results actually within the ambit of cy pres
because the latter doctrine is not recognized by name." (footnotes omitted)).
6. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., LimitingDead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use
of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 370 n.56 (1999) (asserting that "[i]n those states in
which the cy pres doctrine has been rejected, courts instead apply a liberal doctrine of interpreting a
testator's charitable purpose, usually described as 'approximation'); Frances Howell Rudko, The Cy
Pres Doctrine in the United States: From Extreme Reluctance to Affirmative Action, 46 CLEVE. ST. L.
REV. 471,482 (1998) (referring to "equitable approximation" as the doctrine that governs administrative
modifications to charitable trusts); FISCH, supra note 4, at 255 (equating "Deviation" with
"Approximation" in the Index); Evelyn Brody, The Charity in Bankruptcy and Ghosts of Donors Past,
Present, and Future, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 471, 476 n. 16 (2005) (stating that "two trust doctrines
have developed for modifying a restriction: cypres in a case where the charitable purpose has failed, and
equitable deviation (or approximation) when the means to accomplish the purpose impede carrying out
the purpose in a manner not anticipated by the settlor"); Denise Caffrey, Charitable Bequests:
DelegatingDiscretion to Choose the Objects of the Testator's Beneficence, 44 TENN. L. REV. 307, 318
(1977) (referring to cy pres as "equitable approximation"). For cases that exemplify the lack of clarity
in nomenclature, see The City of Philadelphia v. The Heirs of Stephen Girard, 45 Pa. 9, 28 (1863)
(observing that "[t]he meaning of the doctrine of cy pres, as received by us, is, that when a definite
function or duty is to be performed, and it cannot be done in exact conformity with the scheme of the
person or persons who have provided for it, it must be performed with as close approximation to that
scheme as reasonably practicable; and so, of course, it must be enforced . It is the doctrine of
approximation, and it is not at all confined to the administration of charities, but is equally applicable to
all devises and contracts wherein the future is provided for, and it is an essential element of equity
jurisprudence"); Wooton v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W. 2d 719, 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (opining that "we
believe the court was within its equitable powers ... by applying the doctrine of approximation or cypres."').
7. See BOGERT ET AL., supranote I, § 433, at 135.
8. Id. § 43 1. For the variety of definitions of "charity" and "charitable," see CARL ZOLLMAN,
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must show that the donor possessed general charitable intent as opposed
to the specific charitable intent to benefit only the charitable object
identified in the instrument creating the trust. 9 Lastly, the trust must
either be unlawful at its inception or become impossible or impracticable
to continue as specified by the terms of the trust.' 0 If such elements are
satisfied, the court reallocates the charitable assets to another charitable
cause that matches the donor's general charitable intent as closely as
possible, which gives rise to the Norman French moniker for the
power. 11
From a practical standpoint, cy pres is the law's response to an
instructional void regarding what to do with funds held in charitable
trusts that no longer fulfill the donor's original charitable objective.
Donors, of course, cannot foresee how changes in the future might
impact their charitable gifts. As a result, some donors fail to provide
instructions for distributing assets held in charitable trusts in the event
that the original charitable objective is frustrated by unanticipated
circumstances. Courts exercising the power of cy pres attempt to divine
which charitable beneficiary would have been selected by the donor to
receive the assets of the charitable trust if the donor had anticipated the
changed circumstances. 12 Thus, cy pres permits a court to exercise a
power that it normally does not have when dealing with a private trustthe court is empowered to assign the charitable trust's assets to a
subsequent charitable beneficiary not identified by the express language
of the trust. 13
14
Although cy pres doctrine has remained relatively staid over time,
the doctrine received a legislative makeover during the latter twentieth
century that has continued into the twenty-first century. The most recent
revision to the doctrine of cy pres is contained in the Uniform Trust
Code (UTC).' 5 The UTC transforms one of the traditional elements of
AMERICAN LAW OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS 120-60 (1924); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28
(2003).

9. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 436; 4A Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399.
10. The most recent Restatement adds the ground of "wasteful" as a justification for cy pres.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
11. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1,§ 431, at 113-14; 4A ScOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1,

§ 399.2; Peters, supra note 3.
12. Evelyn Brody, CharitableEndowments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L.
REv. 873, 943 (1997); Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Iowa 2007) (a cy pres is

where the court concludes that the "settlors would have wanted the trust to continue."); In re Estate of
Crawshaw, 819 P.2d 613, 621 (Kan. 1991) (claiming that it was "difficult to determine what (the settlor]
would have wanted").
13. 4A ScoTr & FRATCHER, supranote 1, § 399, at 480.
14. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
15. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).

For a
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cy pres-finding general charitable intent-into a presumption that can6
be rebutted by the party opposing the application of the doctrine.1
Furthermore, the UTC abandons the traditional "as near as possible"
standard for redistributing cy pres assets and provides an additional
ground to justify the exercise of cy pres.1 7 These changes not only
represent the most recent reconfiguration of the doctrine, but also the
most important modifications of cy pres since the early twentieth
century. As evidence of its importance, the UTC has been adopted in
twenty-one jurisdictions and bills proposing its adoption are making the
legislative rounds in several states. 18 If the trend continues, the UTC's
version of cy pres will soon become a majority rule.
A wave of commentary has been aimed at portions of the UTC
involving subjects such as special and supplemental needs trusts and the
information available to beneficiaries, 19 but the UTC's cy pres has
barely elicited a whisper from commentators. The paucity of cy pres
analysis under the UTC stands in stark contrast to the criticism directed
at the versions of cy pres contained in the Restatement (First and
Second) of Trusts.20 Scholars have long argued for an expansion of cy
pres to prevent spending charitable dollars on antiquated charitable
objectives simply out of respect for the dead hand. 2 ' If silence can be
general discussion regarding the change comprehended by the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, see John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1105,

1106 (2004) (denominating the UTC and Restatement as "law revision projects"); Edward C. Halbach,
Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law At Century'sEnd, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1877 (2000).
16. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413; see also infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. Dana G. Fitzsimmons, Jr., Navigating the Trustee's Duty to Disclose, 23 PROB. & PROP.,

Feb. 2009, at 40, 42 (listing the jurisdictions in which the UTC is presently the law as Alabama,
Arkansas, Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Oklahoma, Massachusetts, and Connecticut are listed as
having legislation proposing adoption of the UTC).
19. Stanley C. Kent & Richard E. Davis, The Uniform Trust Code and Supplemental Needs
Trusts, 15 PROB. L.J. OHIO 53A (2005); Frances H. Foster, Privacy and the Elusive Questfor Uniformity
in the Law of Trusts, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 713, 756-61 (2006); Ronald Chester, Modification and
'
Termination of Trusts in the 21 Century. The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2001); Alan Newman, The Rights of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the
Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN. L. REV. 771 (2002); Ronald Chester
& Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform Trust Code and Other
CurrentLaw: Does a ContractualLense Help Clarify the Rights of Beneficiaries?,67 MO. L. REV. 241

(2002).
20. See, e.g., Note, A Revaluation ofCy Pres, 49 YALE L. J. 303 (1939); Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr.,
Cy Pres:A ProposalforChange, 47 B.U.L. REV. 153 (1967).
21. See George G. Bogert, Recent Developments Regarding the Law of Charitable Donations
and Charitable Trusts, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 95, 99 (1954); Johnson, supra note 6; Rob Atkinson, The Low
Road to Cy Pres Reform: PrincipledPracticeto Remove Dead Hand Control of CharitableAssets, 58
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equated with approval, the scholarly community welcomes the
liberalization of cy pres represented by the changes to the power under
the UTC.
This Article fills that scholarly void by subjecting the modifications to
cy pres doctrine introduced by the UTC to a critical evaluation and
offers a view of the UTC's cy pres that is contrary to its perceived
acceptance. Part II traces the evolution of cy pres in England and the
United States through the promulgation of the UTC to highlight the
substantial differences between the UTC's cy pres and its traditional
ancestor. Part III of this Article demonstrates that the departure from
history cleaved by UTC Section 413 tilts the theoretical balance of
interests associated with cy pres too far toward the public interest and
fails to fulfill its underlying goal of promoting efficient use of scare
resources. To counter the theoretical and efficiency concerns associated
with the UTC's cy pres, Part IV proposes replacing the UTC's
presumption of general charitable intent with a presumption of specific
charitable intent. Although presuming specific charitable intent is likely
to result in an increase in cy pres denials, Part V argues that presuming
specific charitable intent benefits charity generally by increasing the
number of charities that will receive assets via cy pres without any loss
in efficiency. The Article concludes that a presumption of specific
charitable intent not only serves as a counterweight to the increasing
paternalism of charity law, but also ultimately benefits the public by
reducing ambiguity in the law, thereby saving litigation costs.
II.

THE

UTC's DIVERGENCE

FROM HISTORY

The doctrinal history of cy pres has a Newtonian quality about it-for
every decision based upon one set of facts there is an equal and opposite
decision based upon similar facts.22 This doctrinal inconsistency caused
some English judges to express a strong dislike for the power in their
decisions. For example, the Court of Chancery in Attorney General v.
Andrew opined that the lesson from past cy pres decisions was that "the
doctrine of cy pres as to a charity ought never again to be mentioned in
this Court., 23 Predictably, the doctrine's turbulent English history
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 97 (2007); DiClerico, supra note 20; C. Ronald Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise
Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L.J. 407 (1979).

22. See, e.g., Moggridge v. Thackwell (1802), 32 Eng. Rep. 15, 32 (Ch.) (stating that "[a]ll I can
say upon it is, I do not know, what doctrine could be laid down, that would not be met by some authority
upon this point; whether the proposition is, that the Crown is to dispose of it, or the Master by a

scheme").
23. Att'y Gen. v. Andrew, (1798) 30 Eng. Rep. 1194, 1202 (Ch.); see also Hamish Gray, The
History and Development in England of the Cy-Prs Principle in Charities, 33 B.U. L. REv. 30, 40
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affected its acceptance in the early United States. A number of judges in
the United States focused on the eye-opening results in some English
cases and described the doctrine as "odious" and "obnoxious" in their
decisions. 24 Joseph Story even commented that cy pres had been
"pushed to a most extravagant length" in his famous Commentaries on
Equity Jurisprudence.25 Despite vocal objections, the basic elements

that had to be proven by a cy pres petitioner have remained relatively
stable over the course of the last century in both England and the United
States. The enactment of the UTC in 2000 and its increasing adoption
by states, however, upsets the stability of traditional cy pres doctrine.
A. Cy Pres in England

In England, a court of equity could exercise cy pres in one of two
separate and distinct ways: as a prerogative power of the Crown where
the court served as an agent of the Crown, or as a judicial power
pursuant to its equitable authority. 26 The prerogative power of cy pres

permitted the Crown to intervene in cases where donors either made
charitable gifts whose purposes violated the law or the terms of the gifts

failed to identify the trustee or beneficiary with sufficient specificity.27
Although the charitable gifts in those cases failed, they were charitable
nonetheless. As a result, the Crown acted pursuant to its role as the
trustee of gifts made for public benefit and decided how to use the assets

associated with the failed charitable gifts. 28 Rather than serving as an
(1953) (observing that by 1786 "many judges viewed cy-pr~s applications... with some distaste").
24. Am. Colonization Soc'y v. Gatrell, 23 Ga. 448,454 (1857) (rejecting the notion that the court
possessed the "odious" power of cy pres to reform a trust directing slaves be colonized in Liberia);
Watkins v. Bigelow, 100 N.W. 1104, 1109 (Minn. 1904) (commenting that the legislature did not intend
to bestow the "obnoxious" power of prerogative cy pres upon courts); see also United States v. Late
Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 31 P. 436, 442-43 (Utah 1892) (reflecting that
"this is the doctrine of cy pres, so far as it has been expressly adopted by us, -not the doctrine 'grossly
revolting to the public sense of justice,' and 'carried to the extravagant length that it was formerly' in
England by which an unlawful and entirely indefinite charity was transformed by the court or the crown
into one that was lawful and definite, though not at all intended by the donor or testator." (citations
omitted)), rev'd, 150 U.S. 145 (1893); White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31, 55 (1852) (noting the "extreme
administration" cy pres in England); Cromie's Heirs v. Louisville Orphans' Home Soc'y, 66 Ky. 365,
374 (1867) (describing the application ofcy pres in England as "arbitrary and latitudinary").
25. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES

ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN

ENGLAND AND AMERICA 409 (12th ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1877).
26. See 4A ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399.1; BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 432, at
128.
27. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399.1; BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 432, at
128.
28. Moggridge v. Thackwell, (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 15, 31 (Ch.) (stating that "where money is
given to charity generally and indefinitely, without trustees or objects selected, the King, as Parens
Patriae,is the constitutional trustee").
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active participant in the decisionmaking process, an English court of
equity merely enforced the Crown's decision regarding redistribution of
charitable assets. 29 Furthermore, the Crown did not have to account for
the wishes of the donor when making its reallocation decision. 3' The
Crown possessed unfettered discretion to reallocate the charitable gift as
it saw fit; neither the opinion of the donor nor the court was relevant.
One of the most famous, or maybe infamous, exercises of the
prerogative power of cy pres in England is described in the mideighteenth century case, Da Costa v. De Pas.3 1 In Da Costa, a Jewish
donor established a trust containing £1200 to create a reading room for
the purpose of permitting Jewish individuals to study Judaism. 32 At the
time, a bequest to construct a Jewish reading room was "not good in
law"; therefore, the attempted charitable gift failed.33 As a result, the
court had to decide whether to return the funds to the donor's estate or
request an order from the Crown for distribution under the Crown's
prerogative cy pres power. 34 The court chose the latter option. Giving
no consideration to the donor's intent, the Crown decided to use the
funds to support children's education at a hospital,3 5 which seems
reasonable upon first blush. But the use of the funding was rather
specific-to support a "preacher" and to teach the tenets of Christianity
to the hospitalized children.36 Needless to say, it is unlikely that the
Jewish donor in Da Costa would have acquiesced to the redistribution of
the trust fund to educate children about Christianity.
The Crown's authority, however, did not extend to all exercises of cy
pres. To the contrary, the Crown had no authority to influence the
distribution of charitable trust assets when a court of equity acted
pursuant to the judicial cy pres power. The only limits on a court's
exercise of judicial cy pres were those imposed by cy pres jurisprudence
and the polestar of judicial cy pres was the original charitable objective
of the donor. According to the court in Attorney General v. The
Ironmongers' Co., courts applying judicial cy pres sought to redistribute
the charitable assets "to purposes approximating as nearly as might be to
that expressed object [by the donor]. 3 7 Thus, judicial cy pres was an
29. See 4A ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399. 1, at 484.
30. Id.
31. Da Costa v. De Pas, (1754) 27 Eng. Rep. 150 (Ch.) (the reading room is called a "Jesuba" or
"Jesiba"-both words are used in the court's decision).
32. Id. at 151.
33. Id.
34. Id. (the money would have gone into the testator's residual estate).
35. Id. (the King was "graciously pleased" to dispose of the funds in the manner chosen).
36. Id. at 151-52.
37. (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1064, 1065 (Ch.) (statement by Attomey-General regarding the
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intent-enforcing exercise of a court's equitable authority over charitable
trusts while prerogative cy pres was an intent-ignoring exercise of royal

power. 38
Although judicial exercises of cy pres outnumbered prerogative
exercises, 39 the dividing line between the circumstances that permitted
the court to apply cy pres and those that yielded to the power of the
Crown was rather blurry. Seventeenth and eighteenth century decisions
based upon similar facts produced a split of authority regarding the
allocation of power between court and Crown. For example, both
Attorney General v. Combe and Attorney General v. Baxter involved

gifts for illegal purposes, but the former vested cy pres power with the
court while the latter held that the Crown possessed the power of cy
pres. 40 Similarly, support for allocating cy pres power to either court or
Crown could be found within lines of cases involving general gifts to
charity as well as cases involving uncertainty about how the objects of
Furthermore, the
the charitable bequests were to be identified. 4'
language used to describe the change of circumstances that triggered an
exercise of cy pres only added to the confusion over the boundary
between royal and judicial power in cy pres cases. The court in Fryer v.
Peacock, a prerogative cy pres case, labeled the failure of a charitable
trust at its inception as "impracticable" while the court in Attorney
General v. Boultbee, a judicial cy pres case, denominated the same

distribution of cy pres authority between Crown and court).
38. But see Att'y Gen. v. Lady Downing, (1767) 97 Eng. Rep. 1, 12-13 (Ch.) (suggesting that cy
pres was a soul-saving device in addition to one that gave effect to the donor's intent).
39. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 432, at 129.
40. Att'y Gen. v. Combe, (1679) 22 Eng. Rep. 825 (Ch.) (a bequest of £10 per year so long as
there was a Saturday sermon at St. Albans, which constituted a superstitious use; therefore, court
ordered that the money be devoted to lectures and a the maintenance of a Catechist); Att'y Gen. v.
Baxter, (1684) 23 Eng. Rep. 446 (Ch.) (a bequest of £600 for the benefit of sixty ejected ministers
declared void and applied to the maintenance of a chaplain of Chelsea College by Sign Manual).
41. See Att'y Gen. v. Clarke, (1762) 27 Eng. Rep. 282, 282 (Ch.) (gift to "poor inhabitants of
Saint Leonard, Shoreditch" applied by the court to the inhabitants of the location "not receiving alms").
In Clarke,the court cited a 1749 case, Att'y Gen. v. Browne, as an example of a case where the gift was
deemed too general to be applied by the court, and thus power to distribute the funds was vested in the
Crown. Interestingly, the Editor of the report could not find any trace of Browne on the books despite
its usage by the court in Clarke. See also Att'y Gen. v. Hickman, (1732) 22 Eng. Rep. 166 (Ch.) (two
trustees died before settler of a trust that established support for ministers did not lapse but survived in
equity; therefore, the court applied cy pres to distribute the funds); Att'y Gen. v. Snyderfen, (1683) 23
Eng. Rep. 430 (Ch.) (involving a bequest to charities as directed by a writing that was no found at the
death of the settlor; therefore, the settlor left no indication of how the allocation was to be made other
than evidence that the settlor favored Christ's Hospital. The court enforced the judgment of the King by
virtue of his prerogative cy pres power to distribute the funds to the study of math at Christ's Hospital);
Att'y Gen. v. Bishop of Chester, (1786) 28 Eng. Rep. 1229 (Ch.) (gift to parish could not take effect
because parish refused the gift); Att'y Gen. v. Green, (1789) 29 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.) (cy applied to gift
that failed at inception).
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failure as "impossible. 4 2 Neither decision indicated whether there was
a difference between "impossibility" and "impracticability" for cy pres
purposes.
In sum, the most generous description of cy pres
jurisprudence in England prior to the nineteenth century is that it was
erratic.
The most comprehensive analysis of the history and application of the
cy pres power in England is Lord Eldon's 1803 opinion in Moggridge v.
Thackwell.43 In Moggridge, a testator gave "all the rest and residue of
my personal estate unto James Vaston ... his executors and
administrators; desiring him to dispose of the same in such charities as
he shall think fit, recommending poor clergymen who have large
families and good characters." 4 Vaston predeceased the testator, which
left the charitable bequest in an uncertain state. 45 On one hand, the
bequest could be too indefinite to permit execution because the testator
failed to identify exactly how or which "poor clergymen" were to be
aided by the gift. 46 And assuming that the bequest created a charitable
trust, the charitable trust had no trustee due to Vaston's death.4 7 If the
charitable bequest was either too indefinite or lacked a trustee, the
Crown could exercise its prerogative power of cy pres to distribute the
residuary as it desired. On the other hand, the testator vaguely identified
the donees of the charitable gift--"poor clergymen who have large
families and good characters"-and some precedent suggested that when
a donor identified the objects of the gift, "defined in any degree," the
court possessed the power of cy pres.48 The case pitted the prerogative
and judicial powers of cy pres against one another and the decision
would broaden the authority of the court or Crown at the expense of the
other.
42. Att'y Gen. v. Peacock (1675) 23 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch.) (describing the failure as
"impracticable"); Att'y Gen. v. Boultbee, (1794) 30 Eng. Rep. 683, 687 (Ch.) (describing the failure as
"impossible").
43. Moggridge v. Thackwell, (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.). The 1802 case affirmed the 1792
case of Moggridge v. Thackwell, (1792) 30 Eng. Rep. 440 (Ch.). In that case, the court found that the
testatrix had created a trust and the death of Vaston did not cause the trust to lapse. Id. at 445. Instead,
the trust could survive for the benefit of the beneficiary. Id. In this case, the testatrix identified a more
specific charitable cause. Id. Given that courts have sustained charitable bequests to general causes, the
court upheld that charitable trust created by the testatrix's will. Id.
44. Moggridge, 23 Eng. Rep. at 16.
45. Id. at 17.
46. Id. at 19 (citing an attorney's argument against the creation of a trust as being "an attempt to
execute an indefinite, vague, intention: which is not expressed. To what extent poor clergymen are to be
relieved is not defined. It is impossible for the Court to execute the intention. They may do something
like it, and for the general purpose of charity: but they must make a will for the testatrix; and in so doing
they may go perfectly in opposition to her intention").
47. Id. at 23-24.
48. Id. at 22-23.
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According to Lord Eldon's research, the Crown, in its role as
constitutional trustee, had possessed the authority to distribute charitable
assets in cases "where the property was not vested in trustees, and the
gift was to charity generally" since 1679. 4 9 In Fryer v. Peacock, "the
generality of the gift made the effectuating [of] it impracticable;"
therefore, the King altered the gift to serve the King's purposes.5 ° Past
decisions in cy pres cases, however, indicated that the court sought to
give effect to the donor's "general intention" in cases where the
"substantial intention" was charitable and the "mode" by which the trust
operated failed "by accident or other circumstances."'', Thus, the line of
demarcation between royal and judicial power hinged on the donor's
intent as it related to the creation of the charitable trust and the cause of
that trust's failure.
Turning to Moggridge, Lord Eldon found that the donor did not
designate Vaston as a sole trustee whose death terminated the trust, but
rather denominated Vaston as "only the means and instrument" by
which the donor gave effect to her charitable gift. 52 Furthermore, Lord
Eldon colorfully characterized the donor as being "saturated and satiated
with the idea of charity." 53 Combining those findings, Lord Eldon
concluded that the donor possessed a "substantial intention" to create a
charitable trust with identifiable objects, albeit vaguely, whose "mode"
could not be executed because of the circumstance of Vaston's death;
therefore, the court had the power to determine the disposition of the
charitable trust's assets. 54 To conclude, Lord Eldon remarked that the
boundary between prerogative and judicial cy pres depended upon the
vagueness of the purpose of the trust created by the donor. Prerogative
cy pres applied when a donor had only a "general indefinite purpose"
while the court had the authority to exercise the power of cy pres when
the donor identified "a trustee with general or some objects pointed
out." 55 Thus, the power of the court to apply cy pres expanded while the
Crown's cy pres power contracted.5 6
49. Id. at 28.
50. Id. at 26 (citing Att'y Gen. v. Peacock (1675), 23 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch.) (involving a gift to the
"poor indefinitely," which the court construed as a gift to "all the Poor in England." The court
concluded that the gift was too indefinite to be applied; therefore, the court sought the input of the King
and the King obliged. The gift was distributed to support the study of mathematics by "forty Poor boys"
who were learning the "Art of Navigation").
51. Id. at 31.
52. Id. (concluding that Vaston's death prior to that of the donor was irrelevant to the outcome of
the case).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 32.
55. 1d.
56. See 4A Scor & FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399.1, at 484 (stating that there was "a tendency
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Interestingly, Lord Eldon could have decided in favor of the Crown
based upon the language of the instrument. The bequest gave the
residuary to Vaston, his executors, and administrators, but the power to
decide which clergymen were to benefit from the gift vested only in
Vaston. 7 The gift specified that Vaston was to make the distributional
decision twice-it was up to "him to dispose of the same in such
charities that he shall think fit" without indicating that this authority was
to pass to Vaston's executors and administrators. Because of Vaston's
death, Lord Eldon could have held that the gift had lapsed. But Lord
Eldon ruled to the contrary and thereby established the foundation for
much of the cy pres jurisprudence that followed. As evidence of the
importance of Moggridge, one scholar commented that "[f]or practical
purposes the law on indefinite gifts was established then once and for
all ... the judgment
of Lord Eldon in the Thackwell case is the last word
58
subject.",
the
on
Combining English seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century
decisions provides a blueprint of the basic elements of judicial cy pres in
England during the early nineteenth century. Application of judicial cy
pres required a cy pres plaintiff to show that a donor possessed general
charitable intent (Boultbee, Moggridge). Furthermore, the charitable
trust must have failed by "accident or other circumstances"
(Moggridge). Examples of such accidents or circumstances included
impossibility (Boultbee) or impracticability, a ground that appeared in
another early nineteenth century judicial cy pres opinion penned by Lord
Eldon, Bishop of Hereford v. Adams.5 9 If those requirements were
satisfied, the court devised a scheme to give effect to the general
intention of the donor as shown by the facts of the case (Boultbee,
Moggridge). These basic elements still resonate in modem courtrooms
in cases involving failed charitable trusts and the power of cy pres.
B. Cy Pres in the United States
Although the doctrine of cy pres was well-established in England by
the nineteenth century, the doctrine barely left an impression on
to enlarge the judicial cy pres power at the expense of the prerogative power").
57. This point was made in the lower court decision, Moggridge v. Thackwell, (1792) 30 Eng.
Rep. 440, 442 (Ch.) (stating that "[t]his residue she did not give to the persons, who were trustees for the
general purposes of her will, but to Vaston, his executors and administrators, desiring him (but not
repeating the words 'his executors, &c.'), to dispose of it in charity with that recommendation").
58. Hamish Gray, The History and Development in England of the Cy-Pres Principle in
Charities,33 B.U. L. REv. 30,42 (1953).
59. (1802) 32 Eng. Rep. 132, 134 (Ch.) (statement from Lord Eldon describing the failure of the
charitable trust).
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jurisprudence during that period in the United States. 60 One study found
two published cy pres decisions from 1820-1829, seven cy pres
opinions from 1840-1850, and a total of only thirty-nine cy pres cases
during the forty years from 1850-1890.61 Furthermore, fifteen states
had occasion to consider cy pres and the courts in ten of those states had
rejected the doctrine by 1860.62 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reviled the mere thought of cy pres with its pronouncement in 1832 that
"no court here possesses the specific powers necessary to give effect to
the principle of cy pres, even were the principle itself not too grossly
revolting to the public sense of justice. ' ' 63 The strength of the language
notwithstanding, the virtual absence of cy pres from nineteenth century
published cases involving trusts shows that Pennsylvania was not alone
in rejecting cy pres.

60. Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr., Cy Pres: A Proposalfor Change, 47 B.U. L. REv. 153, 167 (1967)
(commenting that "[s]ince there were very few charitable trusts in existence in the United States before
1850, there was little demand for the application of cy pres by the courts").
61. See Bradway, supra note 3, at 498.
62. See FISCH, supra note 4, at 115 n.1 (listing states that had rejected the doctrine as well as the
five states that had accepted the doctrine of part of their laws).
63. Methodist Church v. Remington, I Watts 218, 226 (Pa. 1832). For similar judicial
statements, see, for example, Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N.C. 26, 30 (1845) (stating that "we have no
authority in this country, which, like the King in England, or the Chancellor, can administer a fund upon
that arbitrary principle [cy pres]"); Carter v. Balfour's Adm'r, 19 Ala. 814, 830 (1851) (concluding that
"[m]y opinion is, that the bequests in the will are valid, and that a court of equity can give them effect by
virtue of its common law and judicial powers, without claim to any prerogative power, and without
invoking the aid of the statute of 43rd Elizabeth. I do not recognize the doctrine of 'cypres,' which, in
substance is, if you cannot find the society specified in the will, or apply the fund to the charity intended
by the testator, the court will then apply it to some other charity as nearly analogous to it as possible.").
For judicial comments reflecting confusion between the power of cy pres in England, see Grimes' Ex'rs
v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 233 (1871) (stating that "the cy pres power as possessed and exercised by the
courts of chancery in England was derived directly from the king and constituted a part of the
prerogative power."); Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51, 64 (1875) (asserting that "[t]he principle or
doctrine of the exercise of this ministerial function of the English chancellor was what is known as cy
pres; that is to say, where there was a definite charitable purpose which could not take place, the court
would substitute another, and formerly of a very different character. It was not, however, in the exercise
of the judicial function of his office, but in the exercise of his ministerial function, that the English
chancellor applied the fund to a different purpose from that contemplated by the testator, provided it was
charitable"); White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31, 54 (1852) (observing that "[t]here may be other cases in this
country, and there certainly are many in England, in which charities, more equivocal and uncertain than
the one we are considering, have been sustained; but we are persuaded that this has been done either
avowedly, or under the influence of the principle of cy pres. Several such cases have been brought to
our notice on this argument; but we repel the authority of them, as we have not adopted that principle
into our system of jurisprudence. We think it inconsistent with the limited and defined powers of the
judiciary, as understood and approved in this state. By the theory of the English constitution and laws,
the king is parens patrice, the guardian of infants, the dispenser of charities, and his chancellor, as the
keeper of his conscience, acts in his stead. The doctrine of cy pres, is a doctrine of prerogative; and it
seems to be this, that if it can be seen that a charity was intended, by a testator, but the object specified
can not be accomplished, the funds may be applied to other charitable purposes, or that the chancellor
may seize them as a sort of waif, and apply them as his, or the king's good conscience, shall direct.").
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The basic reason that cy pres struggled to gain a foothold in
nineteenth century trust jurisprudence in the United States is attributable
to the jungle-like nature of English cy pres jurisprudence. For some
courts in the United States, the differing predicates that dictated whether
the Crown or the court controlled the distribution of charitable assets
was a distinction without a difference. 64 As a result, some courts
identified cy pres exclusively with the power of the Crown without
recognizing that a court of equity could exercise its own authority under
judicial cy pres. 65 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for example,
called cy pres "a doctrine of prerogative or sovereign function, and not
strictly a judicial power," which, of course, was incorrect. 66 Cases like
Da Costa made the power of cy pres seem dangerous and subject to
abuse because it ignored a donor's intent.67 Furthermore, associating cy
pres with the power of the Crown suggested that cy pres was
inconsistent with separation of powers principles. 68 The power of the
Crown undoubtedly stirred images of royal privilege, and privilege of
any stripe was unpopular. 69 Thus, conflating the prerogative and
judicial forms of cy pres led some courts to reject cy pres in its entirety,
even if the given jurisdiction recognized charitable trusts.
Although charity had not been the proverbial favorite of the law
during much of the nineteenth century, 70 the tide against charity began
to turn in its favor as individuals amassed wealth and states sought to
defray the governmental expense of funding charities. 71 A republican
view of great wealth emerged which held that wealth not only benefited
the heirs of the wealthy, but also brought with it some responsibility to
benefit the public.72 As a consequence, legal restrictions on charities
64. See FISCH, supra note 4, at 58.

65. Id.
66. Heiss v. Murphey, 40 Wis. 276, 292 (1876). For similar judicial statements, see supra note
63. For more discussion of the impact of English law on the adoption of cy pres in the United States,
see FISCH, supra note 4, at 56-90.
67. See FISCH, supra note 4, at 59-60.
68. See White, 22 Conn. at 54; FISCH, supra note 4, at 116-17 (stating that "early courts reviled
and excoriated the English charity doctrine in some of the most impassioned and vitriolic opinions to be
found in American case law").
69. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 254 (3d ed. 2005).
70. See HOWARD S.MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY, 17761844, at 16-20; 40-49 (1961); FRIEDMAN, supra note 69, at 254.
71.

EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 28 (1974).

72. ZOLLMAN, supra note 8, § 184, at 120-21. For a judicial comment in this regard, see
Wachovia Banking & Trust Co. v. Ogbum, 107 S.E. 238, 242 (N.C. 1924) (opining that "[t]he tendency
of modem thought is more and more that the ownership of great wealth is not merely for the
transmission of it to one's own family, but that it is largely a public trust, and that where the fund is
more than sufficient for the reasonable needs of the heirs and next of kin, there should be some direction
given by devise for the public welfare or for the general benefit of the community").
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and charitable trusts eroded and a number of states that had previously
refused to recognize charitable trusts reversed field and held that
charitable trusts were valid. 7 Virginia, for example, had refused to
recognize charitable trusts at all until the state legislature enacted a
statute validating charitable trusts in 1860. 74 Furthermore, courts began
to rule that the Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply to trusts for

charitable purposes and that a trust for the benefit of an entity that was
not in existence at the time of trust creation was nevertheless valid
because of its charitable nature.75 Although the dead hand retained

significant control and suspicions remained,76 charities were becoming
"favorites of the law."

As part of the liberalization of rules associated with charities
generally, courts revisited the historical underpinnings of cy pres and
corrected misunderstandings that had led them to reject the doctrine.7 7

To that end, a total of twenty-seven jurisdictions applied the doctrine of
cy pres for the first time after 1900.78 Correcting its historical
misinterpretation of cy pres, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained
that "in some of the earlier cases the cy pres doctrine was repudiated. It

is quite clear that what was repudiated was the prerogative power
exercised by the chancellor, not as a judge, but as a representative of the
crown." 79 Moreover, a number of states codified cy pres by statute. 8 °
The increasingly receptive legislative and judicial attitude toward
charitable trusts during the early twentieth century is inextricably linked

to concern about the efficient use of charitable resources. To make the
most of the charitable dollar in trust, courts must have the power to
modify the charitable trust to prevent that dollar from being wasted on
outmoded charitable initiatives.

73. See FISCH ETAL., supra note 71, at 25.

74. Id. (citing VA. CODE ch.80, § 2 (1860)).
75. Johnson v. Holifield, 79 Ala. 423, 424 (1885) (finding that "gifts to charitable uses, being
highly favored by the courts, and the public being regarded as concerned in upholding such trusts, will
be sustained and carried into effect, though their duration may be perpetual."); Crerar v. Williams, 34
N.E. 467, 470-72 (Il. 1893) (construing a charitable gift to be a present gift thereby avoiding Rule
Against Perpetuities issues); Schmidt v. Hess, 60 Mo. 591, 595 (1875) (stating that even though "there
was no one in esse, at the time of making the donation, capable of being the recipient of the trust; yet the
use being a charitable one, a court of equity, having ascertained the intent of the grantor, will not allow
the grant on that account to fail, but will see to its effectuation"). In addition to these changes, changes
to state and federal tax laws also provided incentives to make charitable bequests after 1900. See FISCH,
supra note 4, at 120.
76. See FISCH, supra note 4, at 119.
77. See FISCHETAL.,supra note 71, at 28.

78. Id.
at 29 n.41.
79. First Wis. Trust Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of Racine College, 272 N.W. 464, 468 (Wis. 1937).
80. See FISCH, supra note 4, at 120 n.16.
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The increasing acceptance of cy pres post-1900 brought a wide
variety of definitions of the doctrine. Because they deemed application
of the doctrine fact-sensitive, courts refrained from articulating a precise
definition of cy pres. 8' As a result, judicial references to cy pres
described the general circumstances when the power could be invoked
without enumerating specific elements of the doctrine. Predictably,
judicial descriptions of cy pres in the absence of a statute exhibited a
large measure of variety. 82 Even if courts had a statute to apply,
legislative definitions varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.8 3
81. See, e.g., In re MacDowell's Will, 112 N.E. 177, 180 (N.Y. 1916) (stating that "[n]o general
rule can be enunciated as to the manner in which the cy pres doctrine will be applied. Each case must
necessarily depend upon its own peculiar circumstances"); Thatcher v. Lewis, 76 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Mo.
1934) (commenting that "[t]he reason for the rule is to permit the main purpose of the donor of a
charitable trust to be carried out as nearly as possible where it cannot be done to the letter. As in the
case of most other equitable rules, 'no general rule can be enunciated as to the manner in which the cy
pres doctrine will be applied, but each case must necessarily depend upon its own peculiar
circumstances."').
82. First Congregational Soc'y v. Bridgeport, 121 A. 77, 80 (Conn. 1923) (finding that cy pres
applied "if the object of the charity cannot be accomplished, the funds or property may be applied to
other charitable purposes, as near as may be to the original purpose of the charity"); Bruce v. Maxwell,
143 N.E. 82, 85-86 (Ill.
1924) ("The cy pres rule was an English rule, and formerly resorted to as an
exercise of the prerogative power of the crown, but is applied in this country as an exercise of judicial
power. The basis of the rule is that, where the clear intention of the donor was that the gift should be
devoted to a charitable purpose, and the trust cannot be administered in the exact way directed, the
donor's purpose will not be allowed to fail, but the exact directions of the donor as to management of the
trust may be regarded as merely directory, and, if necessary to preserve the trust and carry out the
leading purpose of the donor under the cy pres doctrine, a court may apply it to a similar purpose by
different means. That doctrine only applies when there is a valid gift to charity, and it is clear the exact
directions of the donor cannot be carried into effect."); Reasoner v. Herman, 134 N.E. 276, 280 (Ind.
1922) (stating that "where a charity is involved, the cy pres doctrine of liberal construction will cause
courts to be keen to discover whether the main purpose is charity and, if it is, to treat the testator's
machinery of administration, not as conditions precedent to vesting, but as suggestions regarding the
management. And, if his directions as to management are impracticable, unreasonable, or unlawful, a
court of equity will change testator's scheme to one that is practicable, reasonable, and lawful").
83. Compare GA. CIVIL CODE § 3338 (1900) ( "A devise or bequest to a charitable use will be
sustained and carried out in this State; and in all cases where there is a general intention manifested by
the testator to effect a certain purpose, and the particular mode in which he directs it to be done fails
from any cause, [a] court of chancery may, by approximation, effectuate the purpose in a manner most
similar to that indicated by the testator."), and id. § 4007 ("If the specific mode of execution be for any
cause impossible, and the charitable intent be still manifest and definite, the court may, by
approximation, give effect in a manner next most consonant with the specific mode prescribed."), with
1927 Minn. Laws ch. 180, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501.12(3) (1948) (stating that a charitable trust "shall be
liberally construed by the Courts so that the intentions of the Donor thereof shall be carried out
whenever possible, and no such Trust shall fail solely because the Donor has imperfectly outline the
purpose and object of such charity or the method of administration. Whenever is shall appear to the
District Court of the property county that the purpose and object of such charity is imperfectly
expressed, or the method of administration is incomplete or imperfect, or that the circumstances have so
changed since the execution of the instrument creating the Trust as to render impracticable, inexpedient,
or impossible a literal compliance with the terms of such instrument, such Court may upon the
application and with the consent of the Trustee, and upon such notice as said Court may direct, make an
order directing the such Trust shall be administered or expended in such manner as in the judgment of
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Similarly, scholarly definitions of the doctrine spanned the spectrum of
specificity. 84
In sum, the number of definitions of cy pres
asymptotically approached the number of individuals that encountered
the doctrine.
Seeking to clarify the law of trusts generally, the American Law
Institute began work on the Restatement (First) of Trusts in 1927 and a
final product emerged eight years later in 1935.85 According to § 399 of
the Restatement (First) of Trusts, a court has the authority to invoke cy
pres:
[i]f property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more
general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust
will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to
some charitable purpose
which falls within the general charitable
86
intention of the settlor.
Twenty-four years later, the American Law Institute issued the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts in an effort to update the state of the law
since the first edition.8 7 Despite changes to other sections, the text of
§ 399 remained identical to its predecessor. 88 In fact, the only
difference between the 1935 and 1959 versions of cy pres in the
Restatements is that the latter has more explanatory notes. 89 The
American Law Institute's effort proved to be successful-the definition
of cy pres in the Restatements became one of, if not the most, commonly

said Court will, as nearly as can be accomplished the general purposes of the instrument and the object
and intention of the Donor without regard to, an free from any, specific restriction, limitation or
direction contained therein, provided, however, that no such order shall be made without the consent of
the Donor of said Trust if he is then living and mentally competent. The attorney general shall represent
the beneficiaries in all cases arising under this act, and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by
proper proceedings in the courts.").
84. Compare 4A ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399 ("The principle under which the
courts thus attempt to save a charitable trust from failure by carrying out the more general purpose of the
testator and carrying out approximately though not exactly his more specific intent is called the doctrine
of cy pres"), with ZOLLMAN, supra note 72, at 77-78 ("In short, the rule in the last analysis is a simple
rule of liberal, judicial construction, designed to ascertain and carry out, as nearly as possible, the true
intention of the donor." (footnotes omitted)).
85. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS ix (1935). Because of his influential work in the field of trusts
generally, Austin W. Scott was the Reporter for the Restatement of Trusts. Id. at x. In fact, the
numbering of sections in the Restatement is identical to that in Scott's influential treatise on the law of
trusts.
86. Id. § 399.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS VII (1959).
88. See id. § 399.
89. See id. The 1935 edition has notes a-m while the 1959 version has notes a-r.
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90
cited definitions of the power by courts and commentators.
The striking aspect of the definition of cy pres provided by the
Restatements is its similarity to both English descriptions of judicial cy
pres and early judicial definitions of cy pres in the United States. The
elements of cy pres that had to be proven by a cy pres plaintiff described
in eighteenth and early nineteenth English cases like Moggridge,
Boultbee, and Ironmongers' Co. unambiguously appear in the definition
offered in the Restatement. Furthermore, those same elements surfaced
in nineteenth century judicial opinions describing the power in the
United States long before the Restatements. The 1884 Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, for example, asserted:

[I]f a trust be designed for a purpose which is accomplished before it
becomes available, or is impracticable, the court will sometimes, though
not always, apply it to some other proximate purpose. And again in the
case of a trust which has been long in existence, if, by change of
circumstances, it ceases to be useful according to its original intent, it will
be reapplied either wholly
or in part to some new purpose, as nearly like
91

to the old as possible.
While jurisdictions differed regarding the precise definition of cy pres
and the circumstances under which it applied, the definitions embodied
the same fundamental concepts-a cy pres petitioner had to prove that
the donor had general charitable intent and that changed circumstances
frustrated the donor's intent.
As the American Law Institute began work on the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts in the late 1980s to account for developments since the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, trust law remained sparse even though
the use of trusts as planning devices had increased. 92 Furthermore,
proposed codifications like the Restatements failed to address some
topics, which left trust law in a "fragmentary" state. 93 As a result, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws decided
to address the gaps in trust law in 1993. 94 While several states had
comprehensive trust statutes in their state codes, the UTC represented
the "first comprehensive uniform act on the subject of trusts" and was

90. For judicial references, see, for example, Simmons v. Parsons Coll., 256 N.W.2d 225, 227
(Iowa 1977); Dunbar v. Bd. of Trs. of George W. Clayton Coll., 462 P.2d 28, 30 (Colo. 1969); Burr v.
Brooks, 416 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ill. 1981). For academic commentary, see Rudko, supra note 6;
Committee on Charitable Trusts and Foundations, supra note 5; Peters, supra note 3.
91. Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412, 435-36 (1884).
92. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisionsand Policy Issues,
67 Mo. L. REv. 143, 144 (2002).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 145.
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enacted by the Commissioners in 2000. 95 The UTC covers everything
from the creation of an express trust to the reporting duties of trustees
regarding trust information. 96 Charitable trusts are the subject of
Sections 405-413 and the UTC's version of cy pres is detailed in
Section 413(a). 97 Section 413(a) states that:
if a particular charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable,

impossible to achieve, or wasteful:
(1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part;
(2) the trust property does not revert to the settlor or the settlor's
successors in interest; and
(3) the court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by
directing that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole
98 or in
part, in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes.
Section 413(b) reduces the eligible number of takers of assets upon
failure of a charitable trust by limiting the effect of a gift-over to a
noncharitable beneficiary. 99 To be effective, the gift-over must either
return to the donor while living or become operative within twenty-one
years from the trust's creation. 100

C. Comparing TraditionalCy Pres and UTC Section 413(a)
Comparing the traditional elements of cy pres to those enumerated in
UTC Section 413(a) shows that they are far from mirror images. The
most important change to the traditional power of cy pres is not obvious
from the text of Section 413 because it arises from an omission in the
text of Section 413(a). Traditionally, the party seeking to invoke the
court's cy pres authority had to show that the donor possessed general
charitable intent. Section 413(a), however, says nothing about the
necessity of finding that a donor had general charitable intent. As the
Comment to Section 413 makes clear, the Commissioners did not
95. Id. at 144 (listing California and Texas as states with comprehensive trust statutes).
96. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 401-409 (2005); id. § 813.
97. Id. §§ 405-413.

98. Id. § 413(a). Section 413(b) states that:
[a] provision in the terms of a charitable trust that would result in distribution of the trust
property to a noncharitable beneficiary prevails over the power of the court under
subsection (a) to apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust only if, when the
provision takes effect:
(1) the trust property is to revert to the settlor and the settlor is still living; or
(2) fewer than 21 years have elapsed since the date of the trust's creation.
Id.§413(b).
99. Id. § 413(b).
100. ld.
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completely omit the requirement. Instead, Section 413 silently creates a
presumption of general charitable intent.' 0 ' If the charitable trust is or
becomes unlawful, impossible to achieve, impracticable, or wasteful, the
court may alter the trust in a manner that comports with the donor's
presumed general charitable intent.' 0 2 The practical effect of this
presumption is to shift the burden to prove the intent element of cy pres
from the party asking the court to implement its cy pres power to the
party challenging it.l°3 Opponents of cy pres petitions, in other words,
must proffer evidence that donors possessed specific charitable intent.
To justify this change, the Comment to Section 413 suggests: "In the
great majority of cases the settlor would prefer that the property be used
for other charitable purposes. Courts are usually able to find a general
charitable purpose to which to apply the property, no matter how
04
vaguely such purpose may have been expressed by the settlor."'
Furthermore, Commissioners expressed concern about the possibility
that the funds held by charitable trusts would revert to the heirs of a
donor upon failure.' 05 The presumption decreases the probability that
the assets will revert to the donor's heirs by shifting the burden of proof
to the cy pres challenger; failure to rebut the presumption eliminates the
possibility of reversion.1 06 Thus, the presumption of general charitable
intent reduces one of the obstacles to relief for cy pres petitioners.
The jurisprudential history of cy pres demonstrates that the newly
created presumption of general charitable intent in Section 413(a) breaks
from the historical foundation of the doctrine. In England, the
requirement that a cy pres applicant prove that a donor possessed
general charitable intent appeared at the end of the eighteenth century
and became firmly established in cases like Boultbee and Moggridge
during the nineteenth century. 107 Thus, imposing the burden of proving
a donor's general charitable intent on a cy pres petitioner has been part
of English cy pres jurisprudence for well over a century. Similarly, the
element of general charitable intent and its associated burden has been
on the books since cy pres gained widespread acceptance in the United
States. Nineteenth century courts applied cy pres only upon a
petitioner's showing of general charitable intent and many early cy pres

101. See id. § 413.
102. Id.
103. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 436, at 157.

104.
105.
106.
107.
(1957).

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt.
Halbach, supra note 15, at 1902.
See BOGERT ETAL., supra note i, § 436, at 160.
J. C. Hall, Recent Developments in the Cy-Pr~s Doctrine, 1957 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 87, 89
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statutes explicitly included the requirement of general charitable intent
as a prerequisite to the exercise of cy pres.' 08 Even if early statutes did
not expressly identify general charitable intent as an element of cy pres,
courts often construed the statutes as not only incorporating the
requirement implicitly based upon prior case law, but also placing the
burden on the party seeking relief. 109 Like England, placing the burden
of proving that a settlor had general charitable intent at the time of the
part of cy pres jurisprudence in
creation of the charitable trust has been
0
the United States for over a century. 1
In addition to its role as an element of cy pres that required proof,
including general charitable intent in definitions of cy pres served
another role when a court acted pursuant to its power of cy pres.
Traditionally, the textual command for a court exercising cy pres was
that it was to redistribute charitable assets "as near as possible" to the
donor's general charitable intent. Courts used the phrase in their
descriptions of the power and legislatures codified the phrase in cy pres
statutes. "'1Although the Restatements retained general charitable intent
108. For early cases requiring or discussing general charitable intent, see, for example, Jackson v.
Phillips, 96 Mass. 539 (1867); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1890); Trs. of Adams Female Acad. v. Adams, 18 A. 777 (N.H. 1889)
(discussing "substantial intention"). For early statutes, see 1927 Minn. Laws, ch. 180 § 3; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 501.12(3) (1948); 1901 New York Laws, ch. 292 § 2.
109. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1,§ 436, at 158.
110. The one notable exception to the uniform requirement of general charitable intent is found in
Pennsylvania. In 1947, Pennsylvania did away with the distinction between general and specific
charitable intent in Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 100, § 10, 20 P.S. § 301.10. The statute reads:
Except as otherwise provided by the conveyor, if the charitable purpose for which an
interest shall be conveyed shall be or become indefinite or impossible or impractical of
fulfillment or if it shall not have been carried out for want of a trustee or because of the
failure of a trustee to designate such purpose, the court may ... order an administration
or distribution of the estate for a charitable purpose in a manner as nearly as possible to
fulfill the intent of the conveyor, whether his charitable intent be general or specific.
11l.For cases using the phrase, see Pell v. Mercer, 14 R.I. 412 (1884); Jackson v. Phillips, 96
Mass. 539, 592-93 (1867) ("It is now a settled rule in equity that a liberal construction is to be given to
charitable donations, with a view to promote and accomplish the general charitable intent of the donor,
and that such intent ought to be observed, and when this cannot be strictly and literally done, this court
will cause it to be fulfilled as nearly in conformity with the intent of the donor as practicable. Where the
property thus given is given to trustees capable of taking, but the property cannot be applied precisely in
the mode directed, the court of chancery interferes, and regulates the disposition of such property under
its general jurisdiction on the subject of trusts, and not as administering a branch of the prerogative of
the king as parens patrie. 'What is the nearest method of carrying into effect the general intent of the
donor must of course depend upon the subject matter, the expressed intent, and the other circumstances
of each particular case, upon all which the court is to exercise its discretion."'); Heuser v. Harris, 42 111.
425, 435 (1867) (stating that "[a] court of equity will execute it cy pres, or as near to the intention of the
testator as it can, to effect the purpose."). For statutes using the phrase, see, for example, KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-22a01 (2009) (commanding that the court direct that the funds be distributed "as nearly as
possible to fulfill the manifested general charitable intention of the settlor or testator."); MD. CODE ANN.
EST. & TRUSTS § 14-302 (2009) (permitting a court to "order an administration of the trust, devise or
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as an affirmative element of cy pres, they simultaneously watered down
the traditional redistribution standard. According to the Restatements, a
court should "direct the application of the property to some charitable
purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the
settlor." l 12 The UTC goes one step further than the Restatements
because excluding general charitable intent as an affirmative element
creates a textual hole that must be filled by a phrase that instructs a court
how to apply the funds cy pres. To fill that hole, Section 413(a) permits
a court to modify a charitable trust using cy pres "in a manner consistent
with the settlor's charitable purposes."'' 3 By abandoning the traditional
redistribution standard, UTC Section 413 severs another link to the
history of cy pres doctrine.
The final change to the traditional concept of cy pres comprehended
by the UTC is readily apparent from its text. Section 413(a) adds
"wasteful" as a justification for an exercise of cy pres to traditional cy
pres foundations of unlawfulness, impossibility, and impracticability of
Interestingly, the UTC fails to define
the trust's objectives."14
"wasteful" to elucidate how that might differ from the commonly known
grounds of "impossible" or "impracticable." According to one scholar,
however, the Commissioners added "wasteful" to the traditional grounds
for cy pres to address situations where the trust corpus had grown larger
than needed to accomplish the original charitable objective. 1 5 Under
these circumstances, the UTC permits a court to order that such excess
funds be distributed cy pres even though the original charitable objective
is ongoing and viable.' 1 6 The excess monies could be expended in the
same manner, but the public fails to gain any added benefit by so
doing. 117 Continued expenditure is deemed "wasteful" and the court is
empowered to direct an alternative distribution of those excess funds
using its cy pres authority.
bequest as nearly as possible to fulfill the general charitable intention of the settlor or testator."); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 36-23.2 (1967) (providing that "the superior court may... order an administration of the
trust, devise or bequest as nearly as possible to fulfill the manifested general charitable intention of the
settlor or testator."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 602 (2009) (permitting a court of "general equitable
jurisdiction ... [to] order an administration of the trust, devise, or bequest as nearly as possible to fulfill
the general charitable intention of the settlor or testator.").
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
113. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a) (2005); see also John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle,
Or What Comes Around Goes Around, 76 FoRDHAm L. REv. 693, 730 (2007) (recognizing the textual

change).
114. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a).

115. See Halbach, supra note 15, at 1902.
116. Id.

117. Id. (stating that the newly added ground of "'wasteful' might be appropriate" to describe
situations involving the distribution of excess funds).
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Combining all of the UTC's changes to cy pres reflects how far the
power has veered from its historical roots. Section 413 creates a new
presumption that transfers the burden of proving the nature of the
donor's charitable intent from a cy pres petitioner to a party objecting to
the exercise of cy pres. Furthermore, the UTC continues the erosion of
the redistribution standard by abandoning the traditional "as near as
possible" maxim and replacing it with a standard that only requires that
the redistribution be "consistent" with the donor's original charitable
purpose. Finally, the UTC adds a new justification for the exercise of cy
pres; a court is empowered to redistribute assets held by charitable trusts
if continued administration would be "wasteful." Without question, the
UTC "liberalizes the doctrine of cy pres" and "expands the ability of the
court to apply cy pres."'' 18 The underlying principle of these substantial
alterations to the historical cy pres power under UTC Section 413 seems
property once given to charity is forever dedicated to
to be "that
119
charity."
III. THE THEORETICAL IMPACT OF THE UTC's CY PRES

The historical stasis associated with cy pres jurisprudence led one
scholar to comment that "it would be overstating the case to say that
Of course,
significant developments have occurred to date." 120
concluding that cy pres jurisprudence has not been the subject of
"significant developments" elides the historical changes that led to the
widespread adoption of the doctrine during the late nineteenth to midtwentieth centuries. Whatever the merits of the conclusion that nothing
of significance has happened pre-UTC, the post-UTC world of cy pres
jurisprudence casts a different, and larger, shadow over the law of
charitable trusts. UTC Section 413 not only loosens the ties to
traditional cy pres doctrine, but also alters the theoretical framework of
cy pres while attempting to redress inefficiencies in cy pres litigation.
As a result, UTC Section 413 unquestionably qualifies as a "significant
development" in cy pres doctrine.
A. The TheoreticalImbalance of the UTC's Cy Pres
Cy pres mediates the balance between two competing policies118. See English, supra note 92, at 179 (stating that "the UTC liberalizes the doctrine of cy pres in
a way believed more likely to carry out the average settlor's intent. First, the Code expands the ability
of the court to apply cypres." (footnote omitted)).
119. Edith L. Fisch, Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 382 (1959).
120. Halbach, supra note 15, at 1901.
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respect for the dead hand and promoting the well-being of the public. 121
Following a decedent's instructions regarding what to do with property
after death is sacred ground in the law. 122 Charitable gifts occupy a
special place on that sacred ground because they benefit the public.
Reflecting the elevated stature of charities in the eyes of the law, 123a
common judicial refrain is that "charities are favorites of the law."'
As evidence of their favored status, charitable trusts are immune from
the grasp of the infamous Rule Against Perpetuities; therefore, charitable
trusts can last forever. 124 Permitting charitable trusts to exist in

perpetuity comes at a price-the purposes for which charitable trusts are
created may become obsolete as circumstances change in the future and
the corresponding public benefit diminishes. Traditional cy pres ensures
that the public continues to receive a benefit despite the passage of time
by reassigning funds held in charitable trusts in a manner that comports
as closely as possible to the original donor's intent. 125
Stretching the efficiency of the charitable dollar in pursuit of the
public welfare, however, is not a cost-free undertaking. One method to
assess the theoretical cost of the UTC's cy pres is to measure the balance
between a donor's intent and the public interest comprehended by cy
pres pre- and post-UTC Section 413. Historically, courts have vacillated
between strict and broad interpretations of the cy pres elements. 12 6 A

121. Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 1111, 1114-15 (1993).
122. See, e.g., Cauffman v. Long, 82 Pa. 72, 77 (1876) (observing that "[n]o right is more
solemnly assured to him by the law. Nor does it depend in any sense upon the judicious exercise of it.
It rarely happens that a man bequeaths his estate to the entire satisfaction of either his family or friends.
In many instances testamentary dispositions of property seem harsh, if not unjust, the result, perhaps, of
prejudice as to some of the testator's kindred, or undue partiality as to others. But these are matters
about which we have no concern.").
123. Wooton v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719, 726 (1969); In re Farrow, 602 A.2d 1346, 1348
(1991). For general comments about the law's favorable treatment of charities, see FRIEDMAN, supra
note 69, at 254.
124. See 4A ScOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1, §365, at 109-13.
125. The history of two charitable trusts created by Benjamin Franklin provides a rather famous
exercise of cy pres to modify charitable trusts.. Franklin created two charitable trusts to assist "young
married artificers, under the age of twenty-five years, as have served an apprenticeship in the said
town... in setting up their businesses." But the apprenticeship model became outdated with the
passage of time; therefore, the purpose of Franklin's charitable trusts became obsolete. As a result, the
trustees of the Franklin trust sought to modify the trust using the court's power ofcy pres and have done
so repeatedly over time. In fact, a court exercised the power of cy pres on Franklin's charitable trusts
during the mid-twentieth century. SEE LEWIS SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND
141-53 (1955).
126. Chester, supra note 21, at 416-17 (describing the "slow, but steady" expansion of the
doctrine); Committee on Charitable Trusts and Foundations, supra note 5, at 392, 395 (noting the
variation in the stringency with which courts construe the justifications for cy pres and suggesting that
general charitable intent is easier to find if a trust fails after creation); Fisch, supra note 119, at 384
(describing the varying degrees of impossibility required for cy pres).
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broad interpretation of general charitable intent, unlawful, impossible, or
impracticable makes cy pres more readily applicable, which tips the cy
pres balance in the direction of the public interest and away from
donative intent. Conversely, a narrow application of the cy pres
elements skews the cy pres balance toward donative intent and away
from the public interest. Interpreting the recent trend associated with
construction of cy pres elements shows that the cy pres balance has
increasingly favored the public at the expense of the donor. According
to one view of the interpretive history, courts eased the stringency with
to the
which they interpreted the traditional prerequisites for cy pres
27
point that the elements had a "tendency towards liquefication."1
The UTC's presumption of general charitable intent exemplifies the
"liquefication" of cy pres elements. Throughout the history of cy pres
jurisprudence, a cy pres petitioner had to prove all of the traditional cy
pres elements before a court would order a cy pres redistribution of
charitable funds. 128 The primary protection afforded donative intent is
the requirement of proving that a donor possessed general charitable
intent. UTC Section 413(a), however, reassigns that burden to the party
opposing the cy pres petition. If the opponent of the cy pres action
cannot overcome the presumption, the cy pres applicant may obtain the
desired remedy without presenting any evidence of the donor's
charitable intent to the court prior to its exercise of cy pres. Similarly, a
cy pres challenger might elect to forgo a challenge to the presumption
and instead contest the impracticable, impossible, or wasteful element of
cy pres under the UTC. If that challenge is unsuccessful, the court will
again not examine any evidence regarding the donor's intent prior to
ordering a cy pres redistribution of charitable trust assets. Given the
diminution of the obstacle facing cy pres applicants, the UTC's
presumption hastens the corrosion of the cy pres requirements; the
balance of interests weighed in the cy pres scale further tilts toward the
public and away from the donor.
The UTC, however, offers donors a way to avoid the presumption of
general charitable intent in Section 413(a). Section 105 of the UTC
divides the entire code into mandatory and default rules, the difference
between the two categories being that the latter are permitted to be
127. Fisch, supra note 119, at 382-83; see also Note, supra note 20, at 320 (observing that
"[g]radually, however, the factor of public welfare became more important in these cases and it became
less difficult to establish impossibility or impracticability of applying the gift as designated"); Bradway,
supra note 3, at 526 (asserting that "[w]hile there is some difference among the courts as to what set of
facts is occasion for its [cy pres] application, there seems to be a more liberal view coming into
existence").
128. Again, one exception to this statement is Pennsylvania's abandonment of an intent element in
its definition ofcy pres. See supra note 110.
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overridden by the donor. 129 The power of cy pres in Section 413 is a
default rule;' 30 therefore, the settlor has the authority to escape Section
413 by providing an alternate distribution in the terms of the trust to be
given effect if the trust becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible, or
wasteful.' 3' If the settlor/donor leaves an instructional vacuum in the
terms of the trust, Section 413 fills the empty space with its presumption
and subsequent redistribution of the charitable assets pursuant to the
court's equitable power. Under the UTC, then, the donor's failure to
account for the possibility that a charitable trust might struggle to meet
the charitable objective in the future caused the balance to tip in favor of
the public interest at the expense of the donor's intent.
The UTC's recognition that a donor possesses the power to draft
around the possibility of an exercise of cy pres does little more than
codify a power that long belonged to donors.' 32 Despite the drafting
authority vested in donors, some courts invent reasons to avoid giving
effect to gift-over provisions and deploy cy pres regardless of the
express language of the instrument. In Home for Incurables ofBalt. City
v. University of Maryland Medical Systems Corp., for example, the

settlor created a charitable trust so that the Home could construct a
facility for "white patients who need physical rehabilitation."' 33 If, for
some reason, the charitable gift was "not acceptable," the donor
instructed that the charitable funds should be distributed to the
University of Maryland Hospital. 134 The lower court held that the
University of Maryland was entitled to the charitable funds per the giftover and the Home appealed that ruling. 135 The University argued that
the presence of the gift-over indicated that the donor possessed specific
charitable intent thus barring cy pres, but the court of appeals
disagreed. 136 According to the appellate court, including the gift-over to
another charity indicated that the settlor possessed general charitable
intent. 137 Thus, the court awarded the funds to the Home sans the
129. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 (2005).

130. Id. § 105(b)(4).
131. Id. § 413. The Comment to § 413 states that "[s]ubsection (a) emphasizes that the Uniform
Trust Code is primarily a default statute. While this Code provides numerous procedural rules on which
a settlor may wish to rely, the settlor is generally free to override these rules and to prescribe the
conditions under which the trust is to be administered." Id. § 413 cmt.
132. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 436-37, at 160-70; Fisch, supra note 119, at 391
(concluding a "crystallized" rule exists that "cy pres is inapplicable when the donor by a gift over
declares how the funds should be used upon failure.").
133. 797 A.2d 746, 747 (Md. Ct. App. 2002).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 750, 756.
136. Id. at 754.
137. Id. at 756 (stating that "where the gift over is also to a charity, it would seem that the
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38
unlawful racial restriction.'
Contrary to Baltimore City, many courts construe the inclusion of a
gift-over as meaning that the donor possessed specific charitable
intent.139 For those courts, including a gift-over suggests that a donor
had a specific plan in mind if circumstances warranted an alternate
140
distribution, which is equated to specific charitable intent.
Conversely, omitting a gift-over suggests that a donor possessed general
charitable intent. Reasoning that the inclusion of a charitable gift-over
equates to general charitable intent, like the court in Baltimore City,
defies the language of the instrument and commonly accepted rules of
interpretation in cy pres cases. The donor presumably intended for the
gift-over to be given effect if the initial gift failed or else the gift-over
would not have been included in the language of the instrument. And
whatever the Baltimore City donor intended by the phrase "not
acceptable," the phrase must invariably include a finding that the racial
restriction is unlawful. As a result, the court should have awarded the
charitable funds to the University. In combination with decisions like
Baltimore City, then, both the presence and absence of a gift-over is
sufficient evidence of general charitable intent to invoke cy pres.
Like the court in Baltimore City, other courts have not hesitated to
employ cy pres notwithstanding the inclusion of a gift-over in the event
that the charitable trust becomes obsolete.141 Courts have employed a
variety of techniques to circumnavigate a gift-over without reaching the
thorny question of the applicability of cy pres.142 For example, courts
have relied on the discretion of trustees, modified charitable trusts using
equitable deviation, or broadly construed the original charitable gift to
avoid honoring a gift-over.143 Because of the ample evidence that the
inclusion of a gift-over has not always been honored by courts, the
UTC's denomination of cy pres as a default rule does not offer the
greatest protection for a donor's intent.
The protection afforded
donative intent is only as great as the court permits; therefore, the

testator's general charitable intent is confirmed.").
138. Id.
139. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1,§ 437, at 165; 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1,
§ 399.2, at 492-96.
140. Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over?: The Search for Coherence in Judicial Reform of
FailedCharitable Trusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 41, 45 (1989) (finding that "[c]onceptually, the chief
reason for the rule is the general charitable intent requirement itself; specifically, a gift over shows a
specific alternative intent inconsistent with the possibility of general charitable intent.").
141. See Fisch, supra note 119, at 390; Note, supra note 20, at 318 (citing In re Young Women's
Christian Ass'n of N.Y., 126 A. 610 (N.J. Ch. 1924); Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co. No. 2, 130 N.E.
613 (N.Y. 1921)).
142. See Chester, supra note 140, at 57-59.
143. Id.
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historical ability of courts to escape the language of charitable trust
instruments fails to return the interests weighed in the cy pres balance to
a position of equipoise.
In addition to the textual omission that occasioned the presumption of
general charitable intent, the two textual changes drafted into UTC
Section 413 also alter the balance of interests comprehended by cy pres.
Interestingly, the Comment to UTC Section 413 is silent about the
change from the traditional "as near as possible" cy pres standard to the
"in a manner consistent" standard. Nonetheless, one clue to the meaning
of this textual change can be found by examining the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts. The Uniform Law Commissioners commenced work
on the UTC in 1993 and coordinated their efforts with those drafting the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts. 144 In fact, Commissioners worked so
closely with the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts that the
UTC "could be described as a codification of the Restatement."' 14 5 As a
result, the comments affixed to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
illuminate the cy pres provision in the UTC.
Section 67 of the Restatement (Third) directs that charitable assets be
distributed to a charitable purpose that "reasonably approximates the
designated purpose."' 146 The "reasonably approximates" standard of the
Restatement (Third) diverges from the traditional "as near as possible"
standard-those two phrases are neither textual nor functional
equivalents. As evidence of the divergence, the Comment to the
Restatement (Third) expressly states that the distribution ordered by the
court "need not be the nearest possible but one reasonably similar or
close to the settlor's designated purpose."1 47 Furthermore, the Comment
suggests that numerous uses might be "reasonably close to the original,"
but the court should opt for the use that has a "greater usefulness than
the others that have been identified."' 148 The Restatement (Third) of
Trusts justifies this linguistic change on the ground that "it is reasonable
to suppose that among relatively similar purposes charitably inclined
settlors would tend to prefer those most beneficial to their
communities." 149
The influence of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts on the UTC is
reflected in the UTC's redistribution standard. Textually, the UTC's
requirement that a court disburse funds "in a manner consistent with the
144. English, supra note 92, at 147.
145. Id. at 148.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).

147. Id. at cmt. d.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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settlor's charitable purposes" is not the equivalent of the traditional
command to assign funds "as near as possible" to the donor's original
intent. The UTC's phrase suggests a broader conception of cy pres than
the traditional notion that the assets be applied "as near as possible" to
the settlor's original charitable intent. Indeed, the UTC's language
could be used to justify the redistribution of the charitable assets from a
Jewish reading room to teaching children about Christianity in Da
Costa. After all, both promote education, which was "consistent with
the settlor's charitable purposes." In light of the change to the phrase,
the power described in the UTC should no longer be called "cy pres"
because the definition of the traditional phrase no longer applies.
Instead, the redistribution standard embraced by the UTC should be
coined suffisamment proche de, which means that the court's
redistribution is satisfactory if it is "near enough to" to the donor's
original charitable purpose.
Whether courts exercise the increase in latitude given to their
redistribution decisions remains to be seen, but the change represents
more than just semantics. The UTC, and the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts for that matter, signifies a fundamental transfer of
decisionmaking power from donors to courts. Indeed, the Chairman of
the Committee that drafted the UTC remarked that UTC Section 413
"simplifies cy pres and gives a judge more options than the existing law
of many states."' 50 The UTC justifies this expansion on the ground that
most donors would prefer that their original charitable gifts be used for
other charitable purposes if the original objective can no longer be
obtained. The underlying assumptions are that donors not only possess
such a preference, but also that they would acquiesce to the court's
power to make the decision. Both assumptions are speculative.
The second textual change, the addition of "wasteful" as a ground
justifying an exercise of cy pres, shifts the theoretical cy pres balance in
the same direction as the UTC's other changes. As a general matter,
relief is more readily accessible with a greater number of avenues
leading to relief. To draw an analogy from another area of law, New
York had one ground for divorce throughout much of the twentieth
century-adultery based upon a 1887 statute written by Alexander
Hamilton. 5 1 New York courts nonetheless granted annulments on a
wide variety of grounds. 152 Consequently, New York had one of the
150. Maurice A. Hartnett III, A Judge's View of the Uniform Trust Code, UTC NOTES, Fall 2003,
at 2, 3, availableat http://www.nccusl.orgfUpdate/UTCNotes3Q03.pdf.
151. HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 30 (1988).
152. J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF
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lower divorce rates in the country, but led the nation in the number of
annulments granted to those seeking an alternative to divorce. 153 The
expansion of the cy pres grounds in UTC Section 413 portends a similar
effect. Adding "wasteful" as a ground for cy pres to the existing
grounds of "impossible" and "impracticable" provides cy pres applicants
another avenue to relief. If the facts do not fit the definitions of
"impossible" or "impracticable," they may fit under the umbrella of
"wasteful." This expands the public interest at the expense of the
donor's original charitable intent.
B. Efficiency and the UTC's Cy Pres
Because of the variety of ways in which they are applied by courts,
presumptions have been called "the slipperiest member of the family of
legal terms."' 154
Nonetheless, presumptions serve an important
evidentiary function within the courtroom and are created for a variety
of reasons. A presumption, for example, might be created to support a
social policy, such as the nineteenth century's presumption that
possession of land equated to ownership, which promoted the
development of land. 155 Presumptions are also created to reallocate a
burden of proof to ameliorate an inequality between the parties
regarding access to evidence.156 Whatever the reason(s) for creating a
presumption, the basic reason for the creation and continuing utility of a
presumption is that it reflects the most likely outcome if the foundational
facts were presented to the court. 5 7 In other words, a presumption is a
probabilistic gauge of what the evidence would show if the court had
access to the direct evidence of intent.
An underlying reason for creating the presumption is to promote
judicial economy. In the past, the determination of whether the donor
had general or specific general intent has been the most litigated element

DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 90 (1997) (reciting that "Empire State jurisprudence
allowed over 150 grounds for annulment.").
153. Id. (noting that only California granted somewhere near the number of annulments as New
York); JACOB, supra note 151, at 35 (pointing out the New York courts also liberally construed the
annulment statutes. As a result, "New York consequently had the highest annulment rate of the nation,
accounting for as many as one-third of all annulments in the United States."). For a comparison of
divorce rates in the United States by state, see PAUL H. JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE 100, tbl. 48 (1959) (showing New York's divorce rate to be among the lowest in the country
from 1940-1950).
154. CHARLES MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 342, at 572 (6th ed. 2006).

155. Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So.2d 409, 413 (Fla. 1981).
156. See MCCORMICK, supra note 154, § 343, at 574.
157. Id.
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in cy pres cases. 158 The UTC's presumption of general charitable intent

conserves judicial resources by eliminating the initial burden of proving
the most frequently contested cy pres element. So long as a cy pres
applicant musters factual evidence that the present administration is
unlawful, impossible, impracticable, or wasteful, the applicant need not

provide any evidence of intent unless the presumption is rebutted by a cy
pres opponent. The presumption not only lowers the obstacle that
impedes the path to cy pres relief for petitioners, but ostensibly saves
judicial resources by eliminating the necessity of presenting evidence of
intent. 159
The presumption of general charitable intent, however, falls short of

guaranteeing that judicial resources will be conserved during cy pres
litigation. Expanding the scope of cy pres provides litigants with more
options to pursue legal relief, "giving judges more options"
simultaneously presents more opportunities for cy pres litigants as well.
Furthermore, the UTC changes the cost-benefit calculus associated with

deciding whether to go to court by increasing the probability of success.
To that end, some evidence suggests that the number of cy pres cases is
already on the rise. The state supreme courts of Washington, Nebraska,

Iowa, and Missouri have each issued opinions involving the applicability
of cy pres and its scope in the recent past. 160 If newspaper articles and

blog posts concerning recent and ongoing litigation are an accurate
gauge,1 6 1 such as the coverage of a recent cy pres case involving

Georgia O'Keeffe and Fisk University,162 the doctrine of cy pres will
158. See FISCH, supra note 4, at 128; see also BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 436, at 160;
Chester, supra note 20, at 417 (asserting that the intent element causes "much expensive and timeconsuming litigation.").
159. See BOGERT ET AL., supranote 1, § 436, at 158.
160. Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546, 549-50 (Iowa 2007); Niemann v. Vaughn
Cmty. Church, 113 P.3d 463 (Wash. 2005); Obermyer v. Bank of Am., N.A., 140 S.W.3d 18 (Mo.
2004); In re R.B. Plummer Mem'l Trust Loan Fund Trust, 661 N.W.2d 307 (Neb. 2003).
161. For coverage in print, see, for example, Paul Sullivan, To Avoid Conflicts Later, It's Best to
Keep Bequests Flexible, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at B2; John Hechinger, New Unrest on Campus as
Donors Rebel, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2009, at Al; Karen W. Arenson, When Strings Are Attached,
Quirky Gifts Can Limit Universities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at A18; Stephanie Strom, Donors
Gone, Trust Veer From Their Wishes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at Al; Molly Corbett Broad,
Recipients Need Flexibility; Strict Readings of Donors' Intent Constrain Institutions, Devalue Gifts,
USA TODAY, May 28, 2008, at A 1l; Maria Di Mento & Ben Gose, Court Rules Helmsley Trustees Not
Bound by Donor's Instructions, 21 CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 12, 2009, at 14 (2009); Lisa VernonSparks, Town to Ask Court to Rule on Proper Use of Trusts, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN (Rhode
Island), Sept. 24, 2008, at 1. For blog posts, see, for example, Todd Zywicki, A Wave of Donor Intent
Lawsuits Coming?, (April 25, 2009), http://volokh.com/posts/1240675635.shtml.; Gerry W. Beyer, Cy
2006),
11,
(July
Doctrine
Pres
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/trusts-estates-prof/2006/07/cy-presdoctrin.html.
162. Siobhan Morrissey, The Art of the Sale, 94 A.B.A.J. 11 (2008); Farai Chidyea, Nat'l Public
Radio, Bloggers' Roundtable: Pop Culture & Politics (Mar. 10, 2008), available at
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increasingly clog court dockets across the country.
A major obstacle to increasing the efficiency of cy pres litigation is
the absence of a coherent distinction between general and special
charitable intent. Without a definition of general or special charitable
intent, courts refer to a maze of jurisprudential guideposts to divine the
nature of the donor's intent. In addition to the presence or absence of a
gift-over as an indicator of general charitable intent,' 63 the amount of the
donor's estate directed toward charity is commonly cited as an indicator
of intent. Courts uses phrases like the "bulk of an estate" or classify the
charitable gifts as "numerous" to capture the quantity of charitable
giving that might serve as the foundation to conclude that a donor
manifested general charitable intent. 164 Of course, courts fail to define
what constitutes the "bulk of the estate" or how "numerous" is sufficient
for cy pres purposes because such is impossible to quantify. The same is
true of other commonly cited indicators-the nature of the donor's
relationship to the charitable beneficiary, the type of assets held by the
charitable trust, or the donor's personal circumstances when the
charitable trust was created. 165 Regardless of the factor analyzed, courts
have a great deal of leeway
in assessing such factors, which translates to
66
incongruous results. 1
One case, In re Estate of Rood, is a prime example of the questionable
validity of the variables employed by courts to gauge the existence of
general charitable intent.167 Apparently very, very concerned about the
future of government in the United States, John Rood created a
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=88035282; Theo Emery, O'Keeffe Museum Asks
Court to Stop Art-Sharing Deal by University in Tennessee, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at E3; Patrik
Jonsson, A college's art treasuredilemma: to sell or to hold?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 28, 2007,
at 3.
163. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
164. Hardy v. Davis, 148 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Il1. App. Ct. 1958) (noting a donor's "obvious desire
to give the bulk of her estate to charity"); In re Estate of Rood, 200 N.W.2d 728, 739 (Mich. Ct. App.
1972) (holding that "a general charitable intent will be implied where the bulk of donor's property is
given for charitable purposes."); Ky. Children's Home v. Woods, 157 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Ky. Ct. App.
1941).
165. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 437, at 160-89.
166. Compare Simmons v. Parsons College, 256 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1977) (refusing to apply cy
pres because of reverter clause that distributed charitable trust assets to heirs upon if trust failed), with
State v. Fed. Square Corp., 3 A.2d 109 (N.H. 1938) (narrowly construing a reverter clause and
permitting cy pres to apply to a charitable trust after the land in the trust had been taken by the State's
power of eminent domain). Compare City of Belfast v. Goodwill Farm, 103 A.2d 517 (Me. 1954)
(donation of real property deemed to be indicative of specific charitable intent because of donor's close
connection to the property), with In re Williams' Estate, 46 A.2d 237 (Pa. 1946) (court applies cy pres to
redistribute real property placed in charitable trust). See also BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 437, at
189 (concluding that "different courts sometimes come to diametrically opposite conclusions on quite
similar sets of facts").
167. 200 N.W.2d 728.
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testamentary charitable trust designed to benefit schools that taught
political science courses that comported with his views.' 68 To avoid
confusion, Rood "set forth ... the bare bones of political science" as he
wanted it to be taught within the terms of his will. 169 The "bare bones"
of Rood's political science class consumed eleven of the fifteen pages of
his will. 170 Furthermore, the terms of Rood's trust directed that specific
books be used in conjunction with the political science courses.' 71 If a
nonbeneficiary school proved that a beneficiary school was not
complying with Rood's conditions, the nonbeneficiary school was
eligible to receive the beneficiary school's benefits for the subsequent
172
twenty-five years so long as it adhered to Rood's conditions.
Evidence adduced at trial showed the Rood's political views had fallen
into "disfavor," and the books covered outdated material; therefore, the
Attorney General filed a cy pres petition on the ground that the goals of
the trust were impossible to achieve.' 7 3 The trial court agreed that the
objective of Rood's trust had become impossible to achieve and found
that Rood possessed general charitable intent. 174 As a result, the court
decided to exercise its cy pres power and invited proposals from
168. Id. at 742.
169. Id. at 742-46.
170. Id. at 737 n.8. Among the shortest descriptions in Rood's will are subsections four and five:
(4) To prevent self-Seekers getting into this conservative house, its members should be
required to serve without compensation other than necessary expenses proved to and
allowed by the public auditor, as so often urged by Dr. Franklin and others in the
convention that wrote the Constitution of the United States, and, finally, lost by only one
vote.
(5) No class is safe which has no voice in the government, or when some other class is
particularly dependent upon the government for their economic support and, therefore,
especially active in elections.
Id. at 743.
171. Id. at 746. The provision states that "[als a general proposition, I wish the doctrines and
contents of my primer ofpolitical science taught and made available to the public schools. This political
science primer, The History of Building the Constitution of The United States, and another bookFamily Security, are now in type owned by me, and in storage at the printing office of the Typocraft
Company, 445 York Street, Detroit, Michigan, and may be removed by my executors and trustees,
reprinted, or revised, as the occasion may require." Id. (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 748. The provision contained in a codicil to Rood's will states that:
Any school or college organized and operating in the State of Michigan which shall
establish by a Decree of a Court of Record of this State that any school or college
receiving benefits under this Will has for the period of one year or longer violated the
provision of my Will shall for the succeeding twenty-five years receive the benefits under
this Will which were formerly paid to the negligent or offending school under the same
conditions as such former school.
Id.
173. Id. at 732.
174. Id.
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alternative takers that aligned with Rood's intent.1 75 Rood's heirs
appealed the trial court's decision to apply76 cy pres on the ground the
Rood's intent was specific and not general. 1
For indicia of general intent, according to the court, Michigan courts
looked for the presence of a gift-over or a reverter clause and made a
quantitative evaluation of how much of the donor's estate had been
directed toward charity. 177 The court examined the text of Rood's will
and found neither a gift-over nor a reverter in his will. 178 Next, the court
declared that "the bulk of Rood's estate was given in trust for charitable
purposes." 179 Without the benefit of a gift-over or reverter, the
charitable assets could return to the donor's heirs via intestacy. But the
court noted that a presumption against intestacy existed and reasoned
The
that the evidence in the case validated that presumption.180
provision permitting a nonbeneficiary school to acquire benefits from a
prior beneficiary amounted to a "clear implication [ .... ] that Rood, one
way or another, intended some educational institution to benefit from his
generosity."' 181 The court affirmed the lower court's application of cy
pres and offered four suggestions to educational institutions regarding
the use of the funds:
(a) a course in conservative political philosophy in American politics;
(b) a course in American conservative politics;
(c) a course in conservative political science;
course in conservative and liberal political science or
(d) a comparative
82
philosophy. 1
The trial and appellate court's conclusion that Rood possessed general
charitable intent is an impressive display of interpretive gymnastics.
Rood's will and the terms of his charitable trust are the very definition
of "specific"-the outline of what he wanted taught has seventeen
subsections that delve into minute detail of his view of political science.
Similarly, Rood identified specific books by name and provided the
name and address of the printer that has the books he wanted teachers to
use in the courses. While Rood neglected to draft an express gift-over in
his trust, the provision permitting a nonbeneficiary school to acquire the
175. Id.
176. Id. The value of the assets in the charitable trust was approximately $452,000 at the time of
the trial court's decision.
177. Id. at 738-39.
178. Id. at 739.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 738-40.
181. Id. at 740.
182. Id. at 741.
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benefits of a nonconforming school is the functional equivalent of a giftover. The provision operates to transfer the charitable assets to another
charitable entity upon breach of a condition in the trust, which is exactly
the function of a gift-over. The court noted that the "clear implication"
of that provision is that Rood intended an educational institution to
benefit from his generosity, but the benefits only flowed to those schools
that abided by Rood's iiber-meticulous instructions regarding the
And despite the court's
contents of a political science course.
conclusion that the "bulk" of Rood's estate went to charity, the court
failed to reveal the quantitative analysis that yielded such a conclusion.
In sum, the court's application of its guideposts for concluding that
Rood's possessed general charitable intent is specious at best.
The wealth of contradictory precedent, along with the plasticity of the
indicators of general charitable intent, erect a substantial impediment to
the unstated, yet compelling, goal of conserving judicial resources
associated with the presumption of general charitable intent. Donors
either have general or specific charitable intent under cy pres
jurisprudence and the factors that are used to prove the existence of one
type of intent bear on the existence of the other type of intent. The
UTC's burden to show that a donor possessed specific charitable intent
is heavy because evidence regarding a donor's intent is sparse under any
circumstances. 183 Any evidence that might be uncovered, however,
could be used to rebut the presumption and likely find some support in
the case law because of its volume and ambiguity. In the end, the
historical inconsistency of cy pres intent jurisprudence threatens to
deplete the cost-savings of the UTC's presumption of general charitable
intent.
An additional threat to the anticipated cost-savings comes in the form
of the new justification of "wasteful" in UTC Section 413(a). Courts
have encountered situations involving an excess of charitable trust funds
for the stated charitable objective in the past and have not had difficulty
applying traditional cy pres doctrine to reallocate such funds. In such
cases, courts often employ the cy pres ground of impossibility or
impracticality to distribute the extra money to causes or entities
allegedly within the settlor's general charitable intent.1 84 Rather than
add clarity to cy pres doctrine, a novel justification for cy pres threatens
to inject confusion into a category of cy pres cases adequately handled
by traditional cy pres jurisprudence. The inclusion of "wasteful" must
183. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 437, at 186-89 (finding that "[iln most cases, the
evidence on the question of general or particular intent is very meager.").
184. Id. § 438, at 199; Bogert, supra note 21, at 99 (stating that American courts had a
"tendency... to construe 'impracticality' as including wastefulness").
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mean that the situations it covers differ from those addressed by the
existing grounds of unlawful, impossible, or impracticable, and courts
will be forced to delineate those differences because the UTC fails to
define those terms. In the end, the addition of "wasteful" as a ground for
cy pres threatens to increase, not decrease, the consumption of judicial
resources as courts attempt to distinguish "wasteful" from the other cy
pres grounds.
IV.

REWEIGHING THE CY PREs BALANCE WITH A DIFFERENT

PRESUMPTION

The ready-made remedy for the theoretical and economic
shortcomings of the UTC's cy pres is to undo the changes thereby
returning cy pres doctrine to the status quo pre-UTC. Like cy pres
doctrine during the latter twentieth century, the UTC itself could receive
a makeover during its next review that eliminates the presumption of
general charitable intent, reinstates the "as near as possible"
redistribution standard, and redacts the ground of wasteful from the cy
pres lexicon. Each of these changes would, in effect, return cy pres
doctrine to the status quo pre-UTC. Reverting to the status quo preUTC, however, is not necessarily desirable. The cy pres balance had
already tipped in the direction of the public interest; the elements of cy
pres had undergone a judicial "liquefication." The changes imposed by
the UTC only hastened the process by skewing the balance even more
heavily in favor of the public. If the pre- and post-UTC trend of eroding
cy pres requirements continues, the time might come when the cy pres
requirements disappear altogether and trustees might have free rein to
redistribute assets without judicial oversight. 185
To correct the theoretical imbalance of interests perpetuated by preand post-UTC cy pres jurisprudence, this Article argues that a different
presumption should be incorporated into cy pres doctrine-a
presumption of specific charitable intent.
The validity of any
presumption lies in the match between the basic evidentiary facts and
the ultimate fact to be concluded. 186 The Supreme Court offered some
insight regarding where to draw a line between a permissible and
impermissible presumption.
In Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City
Railroad Co. v. Turnipseed, the Court wrote that a "there shall be some
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact
presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall

185. See Fisch, supra note 119, at 393 (arguing in favor of eliminating all cy pres requirements).
186. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 158-60 (1979).
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not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate."'

87

Almost

sixty years later, the Court defined "rational" for purposes of the
constitutionality of presumptions as "substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend."' 188 In other words, where the inference
lacks "a reasonable relation to the circumstance of life as we know them
it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the

procedure of courts."' 89 The weight of the inference of the presumed
fact from proof of another fact "depends upon the generality of the
experience upon which it is founded."' 190
Because the validity of presumption rests upon the "rational
connection" between the "generality of experience" and the presumed
fact, the probable experience of most donors of charitable trusts must be
established. Despite the UTC's assertion that most donors possess
general charitable intent, courts and commentators repeatedly recognize
that donors, in all likelihood, do not consider the possibility that future
circumstances might nullify the original charitable objective. 191 The
Supreme Court of Ohio, for example, acknowledged the likelihood that
donors do not contemplate how changing circumstances might affect
their charitable gifts in Rice v. Stanley. 192 According to the court, "it is
ordinarily true that the testator does not contemplate the possible failure
of his particular purpose, and all that the court can do is to make a guess
not as to what he intended but as to what he would have intended if he
had thought about the matter."'

93

If such commentary is accurate, the

187. Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
188. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1968).
189. Id. at 34.
190. See Turnipseed, 219 U.S. at 42.
191. Miranda v. King, 78 A.2d 98, 104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951) (reciting that "[it is
perhaps true in most of such instances that the testator or testatrix has not contemplated the possible
failure of his or her particular administrative method, and in the observance of the cy pres doctrine the
courts do indulge in a reasonable conjecture of what the donor would have intended if he or she had
envisioned the exigency. Obviously, some courts go much further than others in applying the
doctrine."); Howard Say. Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39, 42 (N.J. 1961); In re Estate of Thompson, 414 A.2d
881, 886 (Me. 1980); In re Estate of Rood, 200 N.W.2d 728, 737 n.9 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); 4A SCOTT
& FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399.2, at 490 (stating that "[i]t is seldom that the testator's intention can
be definitely analyzed and divided into a particular and a general intention. It is ordinarily impossible to
determine what disposition the testator intended should be made of the property if his particular purpose
could not be carried out. Indeed it is ordinarily true that the testator does not contemplate the possible
failure of his particular purpose, and all that the court can do is to make a guess not as to what he
intended but as to what he would have intended if he had thought about the matter"); BOGERT ET AL.,
supranote 1, § 436, at 159 (commenting that "[u]nless the settlor expressly accepted the cy pres rule for
his trust, or negated the application of it, it seems very doubtful whether he gave any thought to the
disposition of the charitable fund in the case of failure of the charity").
192. 327 N.E.2d 774 (Ohio 1975).
193. Id. at 783.
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''general experience" is that donors do not plan for a contingency that
would require a redistribution of charitable assets in the future.
If donors fail to consider the impact of changes in the future on their
charitable trusts, then the presumption of general charitable intent lacks
a "reasonable relation to the facts of life as we know them."
Furthermore, experience suggests that there is no "substantial assurance"
that the presumed fact of general charitable intent exists based upon the
factors used as proxies for the element. The flimsy foundation for the
presumption of general charitable intent is reflected in the tortured
decisions involving the guideposts used to discern the nature of the
donor's intent. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island noted the
contradictory nature of its own general charitable intent jurisprudence in
Industrial National Bank v. Guiteras.194 In that case, the court recited
that cy pres required general charitable intent, but "[w]hile these
principles are easily stated, the possible conflict in application is clearly
made to appear from a reading of two leading cases in this
jurisdiction."' 195 As a whole, the jurisprudence involving the presence or
absence of general charitable leaves the impression that the Supreme
Court of Ohio's description of the search for the nature of a donor's
intent as a "guess" is correct.
Rather than rely on a guess regarding the nature of the donor's
charitable intent, courts have ready access to the best evidence of the
donor's intent-the language used in the instrument creating the
charitable trust. Courts often rely on the language of an instrument as
the foremost indicator of a donor's intent.1 96 Evidence regarding the
donor's intent is sparse and what little evidence is available to illuminate
the donor's intent at the time the trust was created is subject to the
vicissitudes of time. 197 Memories fade and documents are lost with the
passage of time. But the language the donor employed to create the
charitable trust is inoculated against the strains of time, at least as
194. 267 A.2d 706 (R.l. 1970).
195. Id. at 711. The two leading cases from the jurisdiction were R. L Hospital Trust Co. v.
Williams, 148 A. 189 (R.I. 1929) and Gladding v. St. Matthew's Church, 57 A. 860 (R.I. 1904). In both
cases extrinsic evidence was used to establish the presence of general charitable intent. The court in
Gladding found the charitable intent to be specific, while in Williams the court found the charitable
intent to be general.
196. See, e.g., Smith v. Bell, 31 U.S. 68, 75 (1832) (statement by Chief Justice Marshall that
"[tihe first and great rule in the exposition of wills, to which all other rules must bend, is, that the
intention of the testator expressed in his will shall prevail, provided it be consistent with the rules of
law."); In re Estate of Ganser, 255 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Wis. 1977) (asserting that "the language of the will
is the best evidence of testatrix's intent"); Heirs of Mills v. Wylie, 466 S.W.2d 937 (Ark. 1971) (looking
to the language of a will to determine intent).
most cases, the
197. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, §437, at 186-89 (finding that "[i]n
evidence on the question of general or particular intent is very meager.").
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compared to the other forms of evidence available at the time of the cy
pres action. The trust language at the moment of trust creation is
identical to the trust language at the time the trust is subject to cy pres
redistribution in the future. In the absence of direct evidence from the
donor or consistently reliable indicia of intent, the most precise, and
reliable, indicator of the donor's intent is the language that created the
charitable trust.
The language employed by donors in some cases unambiguously
shows that they possessed general charitable intent, but the history of cy
pres shows that including such a clear indicator of intent is not the norm.
Some donors expressly state that they possess general charitable intent
in the language creating the trust. 198 Other donors plan for a change of
circumstances in the future by explicitly consenting to cy pres within the
terms of the trust. The donor in Puget Sound National Bank v.
Easterday specifically instructed that "[i]n the event that the said Home
should be discontinued or for any other reason the Trust can not be
literally carried out I direct that the French rule and doctrine by Cy-Pris
be invoked."' 199 In comparison, most instruments in cy pres cases do not
contain language that clearly indicates general charitable intent or that
cy pres should be applied if necessary. The most probable reason for the
absence of language expressing general charitable intent is that the
donor lacked such intent when creating the trust. After all, "when a
testator has a real intention, 20it0is not once in a hundred times that he fails
to make his meaning clear.
Pointing out that the language of donative instruments frequently
omits explicit language denoting general charitable intent does not mean
that all donors lack such intent when creating their trusts. Presumptions,
however, are generally based upon probabilistic notions regarding the
existence of the presumed fact after establishing a different fact. In the
context of cy pres, the probability that specific charitable intent exists on
the basis of the language in a donative instrument is far greater than the
probability that donors possess general charitable intent based upon the
same language. Widespread recognition that donors ignore the impact
of the future on their charitable trusts indicates that a presumption of
specific charitable intent bears a "reasonable relation to the circumstance
of life as we know them." In short, the benchmarks of presumptions
198. See, e.g., Cushing v. Ft. Worth Nat'l Bank, 284 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)
(involving a provision that stated that "the Trustee in its lawful discretion shall apply such assets for
charitable purposes in assistance of the aged and needy, in accordance with the general charitable intent
as evidenced by the will of W. H. Grove, Deceased").
199. 350 P.2d 444, 445 (Wash. 1960).
200. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW § 702,at 316 (1909).
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support a presumption of specific charitable intent and not a
presumption of general charitable intent.
Ironically, filing an action for cy pres implicitly demonstrates that the
donor's charitable intent was specific and not general. Charitable trusts
with the broadest objectives have no need for cy pres modification
because of the latitude they create for distributional decisions made by
the trustees. For example, a charitable trust created "for the benefit of
mankind" is likely to be immune from cy pres modification because of
the scope of expenditure that might benefit mankind. 20 1 Any number of
distributions might be said to benefit mankind; therefore, the overall
purpose of the trust is malleable to the nth degree-it cannot become
impossible, impracticable, or wasteful. Conversely, the beneficiaries
designated in cy pres cases are specific-a named school, a named
hospital, or the like. The intended beneficiary is limited by the language
used by the donor. If the named school ceases to exist, a cy pres action
may be filed to reallocate the funds to another educational institution
upon the fiction that the donor's general charitable intent was to promote
education. The probability of a cy pres modification is inversely
proportional to the generality of the language describing the purpose of
the charitable trust.
In addition to satisfying the general jurisprudential requirements to
create a presumption, presuming specific charitable intent has a more
specific impact on the theoretical cy pres balance. A presumption of
specific charitable intent increases the protection given to donative
intent by forcing cy pres plaintiffs to proffer evidence that the donor had
a broader charitable purpose than that which is expressed by the specific
language of the donative instrument. If cy pres applicants are unable to
muster sufficient evidence of general charitable intent to overcome the
presumption, their requests for cy pres will be denied. By protecting the
donor's intent as originally specified in the donative instrument, a

201. The language "for the benefit of mankind" is similar, but not identical, to the language that
incorporated the Rockefeller foundation. The statute states that the foundation is
[F]or the purpose of receiving and maintaining a fund or funds and applying the income
and principal thereof to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world. It shall
be within the purposes of said corporation to use as means to that end research,
publication, the establishment and maintenance of charitable, benevolent, religious,
missionary, and public educational activities, agencies, and institutions, and the aid of
any such activities, agencies, and institutions already established and any other means
and agencies which from time to time shall seem expedient to its members or trustees.
1913 N.Y. Laws, ch.488 § 1, available at http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/30ff18839e8f-44fd-9dd9-8bf2d6803578.pdf. The language creating this institution is not only broad in its
description of the charitable objective, but also broad in its grant of authority to trustees to expend the
funds of the foundation.

2010]

CYPRES REDUX

1347

presumption of specific charitable intent shifts the cy pres balance back
toward the fulcrum between donor intent and public interest.
V. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF PRESUMING SPECIFIC CHARITABLE
INTENT

Although a presumption of specific charitable intent narrows the
availability of cy pres, contracting the availability of cy pres is not the
equivalent of eliminating the doctrine in its entirety. A court's failure to
authorize cy pres relief for a trust that has allegedly become impossible,
impracticable, or wasteful does not necessarily terminate an existing
trust. 20 2 Assuming that the trust became effective, 20 3 the trust may
continue to be administered in the same manner and the public will
continue to receive the same benefit from the charitable trust the day
after the cy pres petition is denied as it did the day before the cy pres
petition was filed. Nevertheless, denying cy pres raises fairness and
efficiency concerns regarding the use of charitable assets upon
termination of the charitable trust. The presumption of specific
charitable intent, however, minimizes those concerns.
A. Rethinking Objections to the TraditionalRemedy
The natural question that follows the possibility of an increase in cy
pres rejections involves the disposition of assets held in charitable trusts
if those charitable trusts are terminated. The traditional answer is that
the charitable assets are returned to the donor's estate by way of
resulting trust. 20 4 Returning the assets to a donor's estate, however, has
been the subject of much criticism, particularly if unnamed heirs are in
the best position to obtain the charitable assets upon return.20 5 By
202. If the trust is or becomes unlawful, the trust may be modified or deemed unenforceable
because it is contrary to public policy.

203. See, e.g., National Soc'y of the Daughters of the Am. Revolution v. Goodman, 736 A.2d
1205 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (involving a testamentary trust created to support a nursing home
facility run by the DAR. The DAR did not run a nursing home facility and the funds were applied cy
pres due to impossibility at the time the trust was to take effect); Trs. of Watts Hosp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs,
58 S.E.2d 696 (N.C. 1950) (the expenses of a charitable hospital had increased to the point that the
income from the original charitable gift could not sustain the operation of the hospital).
204. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 1, § 468, at 567; 4A Scorr & FRATCHER, supra note 1,
§ 399.2 , at 496. For cases, see President and Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Jewett, I I F.2d 119 (6th Cir.
1925); First Universalist Soc'y of Bath v. Swett, 90 A.2d 812 (Me. 1952); Searcy v. Lawrenceburg Nat'l
Bank, 229 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950); Indus. Nat'l Bank v. Drysdale, 125 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1956).
205. See Peters, supra note 3, at 260 (commenting that "as charitable gifts are favored, charity in a
general sense is usually benefited, and often it is only a matter of which charity will reap the tangible
benefits. In other words, heirs are disfavored whenever it is possible to say that a trust exists."); Alex
M. Johnson Jr. & Ross D. Taylor, Revolutionizing JudicialInterpretation of CharitableTrusts: Applying
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designating a charity as the first beneficiary of the assets held in trust,
the donor manifested an indirect intent to bar unnamed heirs from
sharing in the assets. 206 If the donor had wanted the unnamed heirs to
receive a share of the estate, the donor would have explicitly named
them, or their ancestors, in the original disposition of the estate. And if
the donor included a residuary clause, the existence of such a clause
suggests that the donor did not intend for unnamed heirs to receive as
share of assets upon return. The inclusion of a residuary clause suggests
that the donor preferred distributing assets to residuary takers rather than
allowing the assets to be assigned to the donor's statutory heirs.20 7 The
underlying objection to returning the charitable assets to a donor's heirs
is that it appears inequitable because it provides those heirs with an
unexpected windfall.
Although a residuary clause indicates that a donor prefers to distribute
charitable assets to residuary legatees-devisees vis-d-vis the donor's
heirs, courts are split as to whether residuary takers are eligible to
receive those assets.20 8 Some courts assign the assets of a terminating
charitable trust to the takers identified by the explicit terms of a
residuary clause, or even their heirs, without expressing any concern
about the outcome. 20 9 But other courts blatantly ignore the residuary
210
clause and assign the returning charitable assets to the donor's heirs.
Such courts reason that the assets were removed from the estate at the
time the trust became operative; therefore, they are not subject to
distribution by a residuary clause. 2 t '
Similar to the objection to
returning assets to the donor's heirs, permitting residuary beneficiaries
to obtain a share of assets that were removed from the estate provides
them an unexpected windfall.
Any party that receives the charitable assets, however, upon a change
Relational Contractsand Dynamic Interpretationto Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L.
REv. 545, 575 (1989) (arguing that charitable "trust assets should never revert to the settlor's heirs").
206. Peters, supra note 3, at 267 (asserting that "if the courts can find a charitable hook upon
which to hang its cy pres hat, the hook will be utilized, to the disappointment of heirs who, in most
cases, were anything but objects of the testator's bounty").
207. See 4A ScOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399.4, at 529.
208. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003); see 4A SCoTT & FRATCHER, supra
note 1, § 399.3, at 526 (pointing out the issue does not emerge unless the charitable trust fails in the
future because the residuary takers obtain assets of trusts that fail to become operative, which means that
such assets have not be distributed by the settlor).
209. See, e.g., Nelson v. Kring, 592 P.2d 438 (Kan. 1979). For a collection of cases that address
whether the donor's heirs or residuary beneficiaries obtain the charitable trust's assets upon termination,
see W. W. Allen, Devolution of Property to Testator's Heirs or Next of Kin, or to His Residuary
Devisees or Legatees, Where Testamentary Charitable Trust which became Operative Later Fails, 62
A.L.R.2d 763 (2008).
210. See, e.g., Indus. Nat'l Bank v. Drysdale, 125 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1956).
211. See, e.g., President and Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. Jewett, II F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1925).
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of circumstances or the termination of a charitable trust is the
beneficiary of a windfall. The charitable beneficiary that receives assets
via cy pres obtains a windfall because it was not originally intended to
receive any benefit from the trust. The donor did not contemplate that
the subsequent cy pres beneficiary would receive any benefit from the
charitable trust because the subsequent cy pres beneficiary was not
identified by the donor. Similarly, the donor's heirs or the residuary
legatees/devisees receive an unexpected windfall upon reversion.
Although the residuary takers stand in a better position to take than any
unnamed heirs, a residuary clause disposes of assets that are
undistributed by the donor.2 12 But the donor, in fact, distributed the
assets by creating a charitable trust to take title to the assets. As a result,
the donor did not intend for residuary takers to share in the charitable
trust's assets. In the end, an unexpected windfall is the unavoidable
consequence of a lack of information about what the donor would have
wanted if the donor would have anticipated that the administration of a
charitable trust would be frustrated in the future.
A second objection to returning the assets to the donor's heirs or
residuary beneficiaries lies in the cost of redistributing the assets to
those parties. The transaction costs of funneling assets back to the
donor's successors in interest after the termination of a charitable trust
long after its creation may be significant.2 1 3 The heirs that object to a
court's exercise of cy pres in the hope that they will receive the
charitable assets if the court rejects the cy pres petition may not be the
only heirs that stand to take upon reversion. As a result, all eligible heirs
must be identified and notified if the assets must be distributed upon
termination of the charitable trust. While it might seem straightforward,
the process is complicated by the multiplication of successors over time.
Furthermore, the attorney general must be notified of the intent to
terminate a charitable trust and either must consent to the termination or
is a necessary party to a judicial action seeking to terminate a charitable
trust. 214 The charitable assets must be valued and distributed to the
takers along with any necessary paperwork that accompanies the transfer
of title.2 15 While some of these tasks are relatively inexpensive in
isolation, the costs accrue as the redistribution process advances.
212. See 4A ScOrr & FRATCHER, supra note 1, § 399.4, at 529.
213. Id. § 399.3, at 518 (opining that "it is frequently impossible and always expensive to
ascertain the persons who would be entitled to the property.").
214. See, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 55/15.5 (2009) (consent of attorney general); IND. CODE
§ 30-4-3-24.4 (2009) (judicial termination); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9-16 (2009) (consent of attorney
general required for charitable trusts with assets of less than $200,000).
215. For example, a writing must be prepared in conjunction with the transfer of an interest in real
property that satisfies the Statute of Frauds. Furthermore, the deed should be recorded.
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Although returning assets to unnamed heirs or residuary beneficiaries
can consume resources, the process of identifying and selecting a cy pres
beneficiary can be a complicated and costly exercise as well. Heirs are
fixed by statute and residuary beneficiaries are identified in a donative
instrument, but subsequent cy pres beneficiaries are chosen by the court
without the benefit of a statutory list of potential takers or written
instructions from the donor. As a result, the decision regarding which
charitable beneficiary should receive the charitable assets is not nearly
as easy it may seem upon first blush. Some courts request that interested
parties submit cy pres proposals to aid in the decisionmaking process.21 6
But courts risk getting more than they asked for when so doing. In
duPont Estate, for example, nine institutions vied for a share of the
assets of a charitable trust subject to cy pres redistribution. 217 The nine
claimants submitted "voluminous evidence in support of their claims to
this fund and their plans to utilize it.' ' 2 18 Furthermore, an amicus curiae
not only submitted an "exhaustive" report that recommended
distribution to one of the claimants, but also filed a supplementary report
that answered the complaints of the "disappointed claimants." 21 9 Not
satisfied with the amicus report, three of the claimants filed a further
appeal to the court's cy pres ruling. 220 Given the transaction costs
associated with making a cy pres decision, choosing between competing
the charitable assets to the
proposals can be as costly as22redistributing
1
donor's successors in interest.
Another efficiency-draining possibility arises if real property is
included among the charitable assets to be redistributed because of the
risk of fractionation. In 1968, Garrett Hardin used the phrase "tragedy
of the commons" to describe the process by which common ownership
of a resource leads to its overuse and eventual depletion. 222 While
common ownership can lead to a tragedy of the commons, excessive
ownership creates an impediment to the efficient use of resources as

216. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rood, 200 N.W.2d 728, 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); In re Abrams,

574 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
217. Du Pont Estate, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 456,457 (Oprhan's Ct. 1965).
218. Id.
219. Id.

220. Id. at 458.
221. For other cases involving multiple cy pres proposals or requests for proposals from multiple
parties, see Blumenthal v. State Street Bank & Trust, CV02008773S, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 578
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (four applicants vying for cy pres assets); Town of Brookline v. Barnes, 97
N.E.2d 651 (Mass. 1951) (two proposals); In re Estate of Crawshaw, 806 P.2d 1014 (Kan. Ct. App.
1991) (three proposals), aff'd, 819 P.2d 613 (Kan. 1991).

222. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCi. 1243 (1968).
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well, which is referred to as a "tragedy of the anticommons. ' ' 223 An
anticommons develops when ownership becomes splintered into
numerous shares-ownership is fractionated-and multiple owners of a
resource possess the power to exclude.2 24 Even though their ownership
shares are small, ownership permits owners to engage in strategic
behavior and the risk of holdouts is high, which leads to economic waste
in the form of resource underutilization. 225 Although a more recent
addition to the vocabulary of property law than "tragedy of the
commons," the "tragedy of the anticommons" has attracted an increasing
degree of scholarly attention.2 26 The fundamental lesson from the
tragedy of the anticommons reflects an old adage: too many cooks spoil
the broth.
Within the context of cy pres, denying a petition for cy pres threatens
to create a fractionation problem if real property is redistributed to heirs
or residuary designees. In the 1966 case of Evans v. Newton, for
example, the Supreme Court struck down a charitable gift of land for use
as a park with the condition that it was to be used "for white people
only" as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 7 The Court's
constitutional decision left open the question as to what was to be done
with the property because the donor's instructions could not be
followed, which was the exact question before the Supreme Court of
Georgia two years later in Evans v. Abney. 228 Not only did the court
rule that cy pres did not apply because of the donor's specific charitable
intent, but it also held that the land reverted to the donor's heirs. 229 The
number of heirs, however, had increased since the original gift in
1911 230 In fact, the number of heirs had grown to the point that
dividing the reverted property among them would create a large number
Thus, the traditional rule
of minute interests in the property.23 1
providing for a reversion to the donor's successors upon a termination
risks fractionation and the economic inefficiency associated with it.
223. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
224. Id. at 624.

225. Id. at 676-78.
226. Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673,

700 n.130 (2003) (referring to the anticommons problem in conjunction with obtaining permission to
use copyrighted works); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.Eisenberg, Can PatentsDeter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Scl. 698 (1998).
227. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 297-302 (1966).
228. 165 S.E.2d 160, 164 (Ga. 1968), aftfd, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
229. Id. at 164-66.
230. Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trustsfor the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L. J. 295,
305 (1988).
231. Id.
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Indeed, the duration of many charitable trusts almost guarantees that a
large number of successors will be eligible to take a share of real
property held by charitable trusts upon return.232
The law's remedy to the threat of waste associated with fractionation
upon reversion is a partition by sale. Common ownership of real
property can lead to inefficiency because of the high transaction costs of
dealing with the property.233 A partition by sale places the subject
property up for auction to the highest bidder and the proceeds of the sale
are distributed to the owners according to their interests. 234 The highest
bid reflects the value placed on the property; therefore, the property
moves from a low value use to a higher value use, which is an efficient
outcome. Of course, some fractional owners are forced to sell their
interests. 235 But the value placed on the property by owners who receive
their interests via cy pres does not, in all likelihood, exceed the fair
market value of the property. The fractional cy pres owners probably do
not attach much, if any, subjective value to the property because they
have not owned the property for a long period of time. And although the
public loses the charitable use of the real property, the public gains in
the form of taxes generated from the private use of the property. The
public, in effect, paid for the charitable use of the property with the lost
taxes on the property because of its charitable use.23 6 Upon partition,
the charitable assets are funneled back into the private sector and the
gain associated with the tax revenue could represent a net gain for the
public.
Given the costs associated with judicial application of cy pres in favor
of a subsequent beneficiary, redistributing the assets of charitable trust
to a donor's successors in interest is at least as efficient as allocating the
assets to a subsequent charitable beneficiary via cy pres. 237 Cy pres
232. Real property is commonly held in charitable trusts. See, e.g., Belfast v. Goodwill Farm, 103
A.2d 517 (Me. 1954) (charitable trust assets included home of testator); In re Williams' Estate, 46 A.2d
237 (Pa. 1946) (home given to charitable trust by testator); In re Estate of duPont, 663 A.2d. 470 (1994)
(home in charitable trust to be use as monument); Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa
2007) (farmland placed in charitable trust); Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 113 P.3d 463 (Wash.
2005).
233. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 75 (7th ed. 2007).
234. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 291-300 (6th ed. 2006).
235. Thomas J. Miceli & C. F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate, or, Breaking Up Is (Not) Hard

to Do, 29 J.LEGAL STUD. 783 (2000).
236. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 766 (7th ed. 2005) (stating that
"[blecause taxpayers in effect subsidize charities by way of federal tax deductions.").
237. See Macey, supra note 231, at 306 (asserting that "the argument that the cy pres doctrine
unambiguously serves the interests of economic efficiency by reconciling the goals of settlors with
unanticipated future events seems doubtful when examined closely. An alternative rule which stipulates
that the settlor's assets always revert back to his heirs whenever any significant aspect of the settlor's
intentions are thwarted, unless the settlor provides for a contrary result, would serve the interests of
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comprehends an undue windfall to whichever party obtains the assets of
the charitable trust subject to the action and the costs of redistribution to
a donor's heirs or residuary beneficiaries are not unambiguously greater
than the costs of cy pres. Furthermore, partitioning real property
formerly held by a charitable trust may prove to be an efficiencypromoting solution. Land uses change over time; therefore, the
subsequent private use of the land may represent the highest and best use
of the property and provide a greater benefit to the public compared to
its prior use. Different cases, of course, will involve different costs, but
disfavoring the donor's heirs solely because of the potential costs
associated with redistribution to those heirs exaggerates the cost savings
of cy pres.
B. The DraftingImpact of PresumingSpecific CharitableIntent

While the traditional justifications for presumptions have little, if any,
impact on an individual's decisionmaking unless that individual is
involved in litigation,238 presuming specific charitable intent can be a
harbinger of change outside of the courtroom. Paradoxically, a
presumption of specific general charitable intent would provide manifest
evidence of what the UTC presumes-the existence of general
charitable intent. If, as the UTC surmises, most donors would prefer to
have charitable assets reallocated to another charitable beneficiary rather
than revert to successors in interest, they will presumably make that
intent clear in the donative instruments. After all, an increase in cy pres
denials resulting from the presumption of specific charitable intent gives
donors what the UTC alleges most donors do not want-a reversion. If
donors do not possess the UTC's presumed general charitable intent,
then they possess specific charitable intent and the proposed
presumption protects that specific intent. To that end, the language
donors employ will reflect the nature of the intent they possess. Thus,
the presumption of specific charitable intent can serve as a stimulus for
improved planning and drafting.
Incorporating language into donative instruments to indicate one's
intent upon a change of circumstances could be as simple as an explicit
statement indicating that a donor wishes to opt-in or opt-out of cy pres in
the event that the donor's objective is thwarted in the future. The history
of cy pres jurisprudence demonstrates that courts have not always been
efficiency at least as well.").
238. See MCCORMICK, supra note 154, § 343, at 574; see also Charles V. Laughlin, In Support of
the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REv. 195, 196-207 (1954) (listing eight different ways
in which courts use presumptions).
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faithful to gift-over language in charitable instruments, but a gift-over is
not the equivalent of an express opt-in or opt-out clause in the donative
instrument. Language creating a gift-over simply names a subsequent
beneficiary, which gives the court ample leeway to evade the language
by describing the gift-over as "secondary" or the initial charitable gift as
reflecting the donor's "primary" intent.23 9 On the other hand, a decision
that is contrary to express opt-in or opt-out language on the face of the
instrument would require interpretive gymnastics that would contravene
that maxim that a court first looks to the language of the instrument to
determine the intent of the donor. 240 Provided that courts honor the
language drafted by the donor, straightforward opt-in and opt-out
clauses reduce the error rate associated with the intent determination
because they unambiguously indicate the donor's preferences under the
circumstances. Errors cannot be eliminated entirely, but the probability
of reaching an erroneous result can be reduced compared to the probable
error rate under the UTC.
From an economic perspective, the presumption of specific charitable
intent shifts the costs associated with deciding how to distribute
charitable assets upon a change of circumstances that could be addressed
by cy pres. Both pre- and post-UTC cy pres jurisprudence permits
donors to transfer those costs to a court if unanticipated circumstances
arise that bring cy pres into the picture. Externalizing the transaction
costs at the time that the charitable trust is created has a snowball
effect-the transaction costs associated with a future cy pres action
accumulate over time as heirs and residuary takers multiply. Presuming
specific charitable intent relocates the costs of decisionmaking to donors
by prodding them to make a decision or suffer what are ostensibly
disfavored consequences. Donors either draft substitute plans in the
instruments creating their charitable trusts or assume the consequences
and costs of having the charitable assets return to their heirs or residuary
beneficiaries. In other words, the history of cy pres jurisprudence
permits donors to externalize the costs of making the redistribution
decision while the presumption of specific charitable intent incentivizes
donors to internalize those costs by accounting for a disposition of
charitable trust assets in the future. 2 4'
The presumption of specific charitable intent not only provides an

239. See, e.g., In re Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 126 A. 610 (N.J. Ch. 1924).
240. This is not to say that such language makes it impossible for courts to stray from the express
language of the instrument. The history of cy pres jurisprudence is proof that express language creates
little-to-no hindrance for some courts.
241. For more on the terminology of law and economics, see Harold Demsetz, Toward A Theory
ofPropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
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incentive to improve planning, but also increases the diversity of
charities slated to receive charitable contributions. Because donors with
general charitable intent should identify subsequent charitable
institutions as beneficiaries to avoid the possibility of reversion, a
greater number of charitable institutions will receive benefits from
charitable trusts.
While some of these subsequent charitable
beneficiaries will undoubtedly be sizable entities without cy pres assets,
others are likely to be smaller and chosen by the donor because of a
personal connection. The acquisition of charitable assets via cy pres can
help to sustain a charity that is underserved by the charitably minded.
The subsequent charitable institutions identified by the donor may
receive the assets in the future, but they nevertheless have a greater
probability of receiving assets than in the absence of such identifying
language.
The importance of maintaining and increasing the diversity of
charitable giving extends beyond improving the viability of smaller
charitable institutions. Commenting on the link between tax exemptions
and charity, Justice Powell observed that tax exemption play a vital role
in "encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and
viewpoints., 242 The same link exists between presuming specific
charitable intent and the diversity of charitable giving. Subsequent
charitable beneficiaries, as well as the initial charitable beneficiary, are
likely to reflect the views of the individual donor. Donors generally do
not make contributions to support causes that they find reprehensible.
Because donors are permitted to be as idiosyncratic as they desirewithin the limits of the law-increasing the diversity of charitable giving
sustains a broader array of individualized viewpoints about those causes
deserving charitable support in society.243 As a result, promoting the
diversity of charitable donations by implementing a presumption of
specific charitable intent permits individuals to control the destinies of
their charitable gifts and wrests power away from courts; the cy pres
balance shifts back toward equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSION

The change to cy pres doctrine that most closely approaches that
comprehended by UTC Section 413 is the transition of cy pres from
legal outcast to widespread acceptance during the late nineteenth to early
twentieth centuries as charities became favorites of the law. 244 During
242. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
243. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
244. See supranotes 70-76 and accompanying text.
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that period, cy pres doctrine evolved to patch the hole in the public purse
that would be created if public money had to be expended to meet an
increasing need for charity in light of changing social and industrial
conditions.245
According to one study, however, probate and
nonprobate mechanisms will be involved with the "largest
intergenerational wealth transfer in American history," which is
estimated to be between $40.6 trillion and $136.2 trillion dollars worth
of estates from 1998 through 2052.246 Charities alone stand to receive
between $6 trillion and $24.8 trillion after accounting for estate fees and
taxes.24 7

Given the proliferation of nonprobate vehicles for wealth

distribution after death,248 some of this money will undoubtedly be
earmarked for charitable trusts. Thus, the expanding scope of a court's
power to regulate the disposition of charitable assets under UTC Section
413 fortuitously intersects a period that is likely to involve an increasing
number of cy pres cases.
Rather than supplement the public support of charities that
accompanied the shift in cy pres acceptance during the nineteenth
century, the expansion of cy pres represented by UTC Section 413 is
part of a more general trend of increasing paternalism in charity law
generally. Courts and legislatures inject themselves into the functions of
charitable entities, and charitable trusts more specifically, with
increasing frequency.249 Pennsylvania, for example, enacted a statute
requiring a charity to consider the impact of "any action" upon any party
affected by the action in response to the Hershey Trust debacle.25 °
Language that requires a charitable entity to consider the effect of "any
action" is an invitation to litigation because of the scope of the activities
245. See FISCH ETAL., supra note 71, at 24.

246. John Leland, Breaking the Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at HI.
247. John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate Is Still
Valid: A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7 J. GIFT PLANNING 11, 49 (2003) (the calculations

utilize dollar values from 1998).
248. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future Law of Succession, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1108 (1984).
249. Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in Charity Law Enforcement,

79 IND. L.J. 937, 941-43 (2004) (referring to the increasing meddling of courts in the affairs of
charitable entities. The paper details judicial involvement with the much litigated Hershey Trust. Id. at
985-99.). For additional examples of the trend, see Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A
Historical Analysis of America's Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2487 (2005)

(suggesting that judges apply the operational test and the commerciality doctrine in a way that benefits
their individual views of what constitutes a cause worthy of charitable support); Mark Sidel, The
Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1312, 1329-30 (2005) (discussing the
refusal of courts to recognize an expanded role for the Attorney General of New York in monitoring a
trust).
250. Brody, supra note 249, at 996-97. The House bill is H.B. 2060, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Pa. 2002).
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that might come within its reach. An increase in litigation equals an
increase in the opportunities for a court to exercise control over the
charitable assets. Within the post-UTC realm of cy pres jurisprudence,
the court not only has expanded power to decide how to distribute assets
of charitable trusts, but litigants also have more avenues to relief. The
presumption of specific charitable intent serves as a counterbalance to
the increased judicial control of the redistribution of assets in failing
charitable trusts represented by UTC Section 413.
Although it may be counterintuitive, sliding the cy pres scale toward
the private individual and away from the public interest serves one of the
underlying justifications for cy pres-increasing efficient use of scarce
resources. Clear legal rules allow individuals to order their affairs and
the resulting individual benefits equate to public benefits in the
aggregate. One of the primary benefits to the public stemming from
clear legal rules is avoiding litigation resulting from ambiguity in the
law. Instead of perpetuating the ambiguity in pre- and post-UTC
jurisprudence, the presumption of specific charitable intent creates an
incentive to plan for the distribution of charitable trust assets in the
future that has been absent in cy pres jurisprudence throughout its
history. The lengthy history of cy pres is a testament to the consistent
failure of the law to establish an incentive for donors to consider what
effect the future will have on their charitable trusts. So long as courts
give effect to the language employed by donors, the public will avoid
costly cy pres litigation. 25 Given the amount of money likely to be
placed in charitable trusts in the future, avoiding litigation that drains
those assets bestows a vital benefit on both the public and courts.

251. Cy pres litigation can be very expensive. Litigation seeking to modify the Buck trust cost
somewhere in the neighborhood of $4 million. See Roger G. Sisson, Comment, Relaxing the Dead
Hand'sGrip: CharitableEfficiency and the Doctrineof Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REv. 635, 646 (1988).
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